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Abstract
This Article proposes a novel solution to part of the problem that large
patent portfolios can cause. Both so-called “patent trolls” and firms that
commercialize the patents that they own can accumulate and then abuse
large patent portfolios, even if most of the patents in the portfolio are of
little value. Instead of suggesting reforms to better determine the value
and boundaries of individual patents, as many others have already done,
this Article proposes that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
multiply the amount owed to keep a patent in force (patent maintenance
fees) based on the size of a patent holder’s overall patent portfolio. Patent
owners themselves will primarily benefit from this reform, as they will
have an incentive to determine the value of their patents and to let lapse
those patents that are of low value. A second benefit is that it will require
patent owners to disclose their practiced and non-practiced patents. The
reform proposed in this Article helps alleviate problems in software and
high-technology patenting without significant negative effect in other
industries, such as pharmaceuticals or biotechnology. It is simple, and the
PTO can easily adopt it, or Congress can enact it.
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INTRODUCTION
The legal literature is replete with discussions of the problems that
large patent portfolios cause. While non-practicing entities, or “trolls,”
suing in the software and high-tech industries generate the strongest
complaints, large patent portfolios can cause competition and gridlock
problems even when held by active industry participants. Many of these
problems arise because patent boundaries and validity are often uncertain.
Moreover, because patent holders need not register assignments of
patents and because trolls often use multiple shell companies, it is
difficult to know who owns which patent or how many patents a
particular entity owns. Thus, not only must innovators and firms worry
about the size of patent portfolios in the hands of their competitors and
trolls, they must also be willing to spend substantial time and effort
determining potential liability. And even with those efforts, they still may
not be able to know all of the potential patent liability they may face and
from whom.
A standard economic approach to dealing with unwanted behavior is
to try to raise the price of the objectionable behavior. One option for costbased deterrence comes from the authority granted to the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) by the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA), which
gave the PTO the power to set patent examination and maintenance fees.1
Pursuant to this authority, the PTO has increased patent maintenance fees
required to keep patents in force by up to fifty-four percent for large
entities.2 While these fee increases should encourage some patent owners
to allow their patent rights to lapse if they view the patent to be worth less
than the fee, more could be done to discourage large patent portfolios.
Now that the PTO has the power to set fees, this Article proposes
another adjustment of patent maintenance fees to further discourage
excessively large patent portfolios. If adopted, this proposal will reduce
problems associated with the abusive use of patent portfolios without
significantly reducing incentives to innovate and to disseminate that
innovation. This proposal also avoids the problems of other recent patent
reform proposals that failed because of strong disagreement among
participants in different industries caused by patent law’s differing effect
1. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316
(2011). Prior to the AIA, Congress set fees directly in the patent statute at 35 U.S.C. § 41. Section
41 allowed the Director of the PTO to adjust the fees each year after 1992 to account for inflation.
35 U.S.C. § 41(f) (2012).
2. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, USPTO SECTION 10 FEE SETTING: TABLE OF
PATENT FEE CHANGES 2, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/
AC54_Final_Table_of_Patent_Fee_Changes.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2016). The fee is $1600 at
3.5 years (a 39% increase), $3600 at 7.5 years (a 24% increase), and $7400 at 11.5 years (a 54%
increase). Id.
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on each type of industry. The reform proposed in this Article alleviates
problems in software and high-technology patenting without causing
significant negative effects in other industries, such as pharmaceuticals
or biotechnology. The reform is simple, and the PTO can adopt it or
Congress can enact it.
This Article proposes that the PTO or Congress increase maintenance
fees according to a sliding scale tied to the number of non-practiced
patents a patent owner has in its portfolio. Thus, as the size of a firm’s
patent portfolio increases, so too does the maintenance fee multiplier
charged for all its patents, beginning with the second maintenance fee due
date. All patents with common ownership interests would be aggregated
in determining the fee enhancement. Because the enhanced fees do not
kick in until 7.5 years after issuance, incentives to invent and to
disseminate inventions will not be significantly reduced.3 This proposal
will encourage large patent portfolio holders to pare down their holdings
by determining which of their older patents are not practiced and are not
worth maintaining. This will benefit competitors and new inventors who
are currently subject to hold-up problems from large portfolios—many of
which are caused by old, low-value patents held en masse.
One advantage of this Article’s proposal is that non-practicing entities
will generally be charged higher maintenance fees than other firms that
have the same number of patents but commercialize many of them. By
narrowly targeting non-practiced patents, the proposal both raises the
costs for non-practicing entities to hold numerous patents and encourages
active industry participants to prune their portfolios of non-practiced,
low-value patents.
A separate but equally important aspect of this Article’s proposal is
that, to determine whether maintenance fee enhancements are due, patent
owners will need to disclose and identify their practiced and nonpracticed patents. This disclosure will be very advantageous to the patent
system because there is currently a great deal of opacity and uncertainty
as to two important types of patent data: (1) who owns which patents, and
(2) whether particular patents are being practiced, and by what products
or processes. Because determining patent boundaries is notoriously
challenging in some instances, there may be difficulties in determining
whether particular patents are being practiced. Moreover, each firm will
have an incentive to overstate the number of practiced patents to receive
a lower fee enhancement. Nevertheless, simply requiring the firms to go
on record about their ownership and the alleged coverage of their patents
will be enormously helpful in litigation involving patents and in
addressing patent hold-up problems.

3. See id.
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I. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN PATENT LAW
The grant of a patent is the grant of a right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling one’s patented invention.4 Patent law exists to
provide incentives to create and disseminate innovation5 by overcoming
the public goods problem6 that can occur when it is cheaper to copy an
innovation than it was for the inventor to invent it.7 Patent law also
provides incentives to disseminate and commercialize innovation even
when it is costly to do so and allows competitors to enter the market at a
lower cost once the innovator has created the market.8
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271.
5. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (“The
Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance
of monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’”); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“It is true, of course,
that one of the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information
concerning discoveries and inventions.”); Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent
Validity, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 323, 362 (2008) (“At its heart, patent law seeks to spur the creation
and ultimate dissemination of valuable information.”); Katherine A. Helm, Note, Outsourcing the
Fire of Genius: The Effects of Patent Infringement Jurisprudence on Pharmaceutical Drug
Development, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 153, 160 (2006) (“An unresolved
tension exists between the two purposes of the U.S. patent system: to disseminate information to
the public on one hand and to reward innovation on the other.”). The purpose behind patent law
is set forth in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries”). Numerous casebooks also discuss that patent law
exists to promote these aims. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1
(3d ed. 2004) (explaining that patent law “offer[s] a potential financial reward as an inducement
to invent, to disclose, or to invest”); CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 2 (2008)
(explaining that patent law can appear as a system that “offer[s] a potential financial reward as an
inducement to invent, to disclose technical information”).
6. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 196 n.52 (2009) (“Public goods
are characterized by non-rivalry in consumption . . . . Consumption of information is nonrivalrous because one person’s use does not diminish the ability of another to benefit from the
information. . . . The policy implication of characterizing a good as a public good is that private
markets may not efficiently allocate and encourage the production of public goods. Copyright and
patent laws are ways of addressing these market failures.” (quoting David W. Barnes, Trademark
Externalities, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2007) (citations omitted))).
7. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 5, at 65 (explaining the theory that in a competitive market,
a competitor who charges a price that does not include the cost of inventing will always undersell
an inventor).
8. See Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707–10 (2001) (explaining that first movers—initial group to make
investments in bringing a product to the market—bear various costs that second movers—market
participants who enter subsequently—do not share in bearing and thus the patent system can
appear as an incentive for first movers to bear these costs and commercialize a product that may
otherwise not reach the consumer); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV.
341, 357 (2010) (“The reward theory . . . justifies patents as necessary to induce the invention and
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In this way, patents should encourage invention and dissemination of
new products and services.9 The cost of this increased innovation is the
grant of the patent monopoly, which lasts for twenty years from the time
of filing.10 Accordingly, for new inventions that achieve commercial
success11 and for which unpatented substitutes are not available,12 the
patent owner can engage in some level of monopoly pricing for the period
of the patent. This tradeoff is assumed to be beneficial to society because
a new invention available at a monopoly price is better than no invention
at all.13
Patents can, however, have social costs beyond monopoly pricing.
There is significant literature detailing the ways that excessive numbers
of patents in an area, combined with difficulties determining patent
boundaries, can delay innovation and commercialization of new
disclosure of new and non-obvious knowledge, which inventors would otherwise be reluctant to
do in the fear that others may free ride off their efforts.”).
9. See John F. Duffy, Rethinking Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439–
40 (2004) (“Traditionally, the economic rationale for granting intellectual property rights in
innovations has been that the rights provide an incentive or reward for the sizeable investments
needed to create the intellectual property disclosed in the patent document. Because such rewards
exist, firms have an incentive to generate the valuable intellectual property that otherwise could
be easily appropriated by competitors. Implicitly or explicitly, such reward theories embrace
backward-looking justifications for awarding rights: The patent serves to protect the investments
in innovation made prior to patenting.” (citation omitted)); Sichelman, supra note 8, at 357.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
11. The vast majority of patented inventions never achieve commercial success. In a 2005
article, Richard Maulsby, the Director of Public Affairs for the PTO, stated that “[t]here are around
1.5 million patents in effect and in force in this country, and of those, maybe 3,000 are
commercially viable.” Avoiding the Inventor’s Lament, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 9,
2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-11-09/avoiding-the-inventors-lament [https://
web.archive.org/web/20150407203716/http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2005-11-09/avoi
ding-the-inventors-lament].
12. If the patent is for a novel and nonobvious invention that has readily available
substitutes, then the patent may give the patent owner the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling her patented invention, but may give no pricing power over the invention. See
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006) (holding that “a patent does not
necessarily confer market power upon the patentee”). This is quite common. For instance, an
inventor may invent a new water pump that is not of particularly greater efficiency than those
already available on the market. In this case, the patent will not give the patent owner the ability
to raise prices for his water pump because consumers would simply buy a different, lower-priced
pump. If the patent covers an invention for which the only substitute is another patented invention,
then above-market monopoly (if the same investor patents the substitute), duopoly, or oligopoly
pricing may still be achieved. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548–49 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (finding the defendant liable for lost sales of a device not covered by the patent in the
suit to afford the plaintiff full compensation for infringement).
13. Obviously it would be better yet if the invention was made and no monopoly grant was
necessary to incentivize the invention. In this case, society would suffer no deadweight loss from
patent monopoly. See Olson, supra note 6.
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inventions.14 The term that has developed to describe this problem is
“patent thicket”—the idea being that just as a thicket can delay and thwart
one’s physical progress, a large collection of patents can delay and thwart
innovation in a field.15 Literature also exists disputing the costs and
prevalence of patent thickets,16 with some scholars going so far as to
14. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 68–71 (2008) (explaining that because
of large numbers of broad patents, inventors face high search costs in addition to high transaction
costs for rights to clear those patents); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND
HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (noting that in the information technology sector, multiple
patents cover a new product and that uncertainty in what a patent covers has led to costs on
innovation from holdup, royalty stacking, and litigation); Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner,
Innovation and Its Discontents, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 27, 29 (Adam B.
Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2006) (describing how increasing numbers of patent and
changes in patent policy making it easier to enforce patents have increased the cost of creating
new products); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001) (discussing how payment of royalties to multiple blocking patent
holders stifles innovation); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 863, 869–76 (2007) (explaining that in fields such as computer software, the Internet,
semiconductors, nanotechnology, and biotechnology where innovation is cumulative, inventors
must pay both information costs and negotiation costs to avoid potential infringement suits);
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698–99 (1998), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/280/
5364/698.full.pdf (explaining that multiple or overlapping patents restrict inventors in biomedical
research).
15. Professor Carl Shapiro defined the term patent thicket as “a dense web of overlapping
intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually
commercialize new technology.” Shapiro, supra note 14, at 120. See also Ayres & Parchomovsky,
supra note 14, at 869–76 (2007) (arguing that the high costs of patent thickets chill innovation);
Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 421 (2002)
(“The natural progression of a patent system that grants monopolies on different components of a
unified, functioning organism is a thicket of patents that can be disentangled, if at all, only with a
very substantial investment of time and money for transaction costs and litigation.”).
16. See, e.g., Robin Feldman & Kris Nelson, Open Source, Open Access, and Open
Transfer: Market Approaches to Research Bottlenecks, 7 NW. J. TECH, & INTELL. PROP. 14, 16
(2008) (“Using voluntary surveys, the authors conclude that research is not impeded in the
majority of cases because patent holders can cope through strategies including inventing around
patented technology, obtaining licenses, or simply ignoring the existence of patent rights with the
expectation that patent holders will not come after them.”); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate
Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1004–07 (2005) (arguing that the
presence of patent thickets does not deter innovation in the software and technology industry);
John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material
Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002–03 (2005), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/
309/5743/2002.full.pdf (finding little empirical evidence from a study of biomedical researchers
that the growing number of patents and restricted access to intellectual property has impeded
research efforts).
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dispute that they actually exist in a meaningfully harmful way. 17 Rather
than wading into this academic thicket, this Article assumes that the
weight of the evidence suggests that patent thickets do exist in some
areas, at least to the extent that they create significant transaction and
holdup costs for firms in certain industries, such as software and high
technology. This Article seeks to alleviate that problem.
Worries that some industries may be so crowded with patents as to
deter innovation and competition have recurred over the years. For
instance, Professor Adam Mossoff details the fierce patent war fought
over sewing machines in the 1850s.18 The large number of patents on
sewing machine technology resulted in real delays in the production and
marketing of sewing machines.19 Only the formation of a large-scale
patent-pooling arrangement resolved the problem in 1856.20 Mossoff
suggests that a study of the sewing machine patent war shows that
competitors can find private-ordering solutions to patent thickets in an
industry without the need for government intervention or changes to
patent law.21 It is important to note, however, that Mossoff’s research
shows that there was about a decade of retarded innovation during the
sewing machine patent war before a private solution was attained.22
Mossoff’s argument in favor of private-ordering solutions is
complementary to a piece of conventional wisdom about how
competitors hold and use patents.23 According to this conventional
wisdom, large patent portfolios held by competitors in an industry should
not be concerning because competitors hold these large patent portfolios
17. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Symposium, Patent Metrics: The
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1729 (2007)
(concluding from an empirical study of biotechnology patents that increased biotechnology
patenting has not stifled innovation); Mann, supra note 16, at 1028–29 (finding that there is no
patent thicket in software because research and development spending has not been stifled, and
interviews conducted with small firms indicate that the industry is not concerned with a thicket).
18. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket: The Sewing
Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 168 (2011).
19. Id. at 190–91, 194.
20. Id. at 196.
21. Id. at 209 (“Moreover, there was no Patent Reform Act of 1856 that prompted the
formation of the Sewing Machine Combination by eliminating Howe’s ability to obtain
injunctions, limiting his royalty payments, or imposing restraints on his or other patentees’
commercialization rights. The Sewing Machine Combination was initiated by private actors for
their private benefit—within the governing rules of a property system that provided strong
protection to the owners of the patented technology. This suggests that it is possible for privateordering solutions to be formed in the face of patent thickets, and that it is unnecessary to eliminate
or ‘creatively adapt[] property rights’ secured to inventors by the patent system.” (internal citation
omitted)).
22. See id. at 176–78, 194.
23. See id. at 200–01.
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defensively and use them as deterrents to prevent other competitors from
suing.24 This narrative is analogous to the mutual assured destruction
(MAD) theory of nuclear weapons during the Cold War: no company has
to worry about patent infringement because if two competitors with large
portfolios were to sue each other, it would result in mutually assured
destruction of their economic interests.25 Thus, according to this
narrative, competitors do not use patents to exclude competitors with
large portfolios nor do they use them to slow innovation or impose
transaction costs on other competitors.26 Nevertheless, as Mossoff’s
research shows, sometimes major competitors do engage in full-scale
patent wars that delay progress.27 And one does not have to look back
160 years for an example of major competitors with massive patent
portfolios going to war. The modern smartphone patent litigation war
provides a sobering example.28
A. Large Portfolios of Non-practiced Patents Can Be Problematic
Note that even under the MAD narrative, large patent portfolios may
harm new competitors who lack substantial portfolios of their own. A
large company with many patents can afford a protracted lawsuit, while
a new start-up may not have the resources to defend a suit. In this way,
established competitors with large portfolios can use their portfolios to
bludgeon start-ups into submission or even bankruptcy.29 Whether such
behavior is detrimental to society depends on whether the start-ups were
innovating or simply copying existing firms. If the threat from established
firms with large portfolios deterred the start-ups from engaging in
24. See id.
25. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 468–69 (2004) (describing
that under “‘mutually assured destruction’ . . . very few companies actually sue for patent
infringement because they know that, if they do, their opponents will also be able to sue them for
patent infringement”); see James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2005); James F.
McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of
Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 203 (2006) (“Patent portfolios are being
used defensively in efforts to . . . create leverage in infringement lawsuits.”).
26. Of course, in the MAD scenario, while patents are doing no harm, they are also not
doing much good. They are not being used to exclude others and thus are not providing monopolypricing incentives.
27. Mossoff, supra note 18, at 190–91.
28. See, for example, Apple Computer, Inc.’s judgment against Samsung’s smartphones for
over $1 billion. See, e.g., Joanna Stern, Apple v. Samsung: What Verdict Means for You and the
Tech Industry, ABC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/apple-samsungverdict-tech-industry/story?id=17087657#.UEKdqkKeDNs.
29. See Mark R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1140–41 (2000) (detailing a typical leveraging scenario); Ted Sichelman, The
Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 549–50 (2014).
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innovation, then such lawsuits are detrimental. On the other hand, if the
start-ups were simply copying and competing, then having to wait for
valid patents to expire may not be as worrisome. Rather, the patent system
would be working as intended, with the portfolio protecting the
innovation incentive for new creators.30 If, however, the patents were not
needed to spur innovation, then such lawsuits (and the patents
themselves) are problematic because they provide established firms
monopoly power, with a monopoly’s corresponding deadweight loss,
without providing any offsetting benefits to society in the form of new
innovation.31 This would be counterproductive given that the entire
reason for a patent system is to incentivize the creation or dissemination
of innovation.32
Reality is a bit more complicated than the standard narrative. First,
while established competitors do hold many patents that they never
enforce in court or even license, for most companies such “dormant”
patents represent just a portion of their portfolios.33 In fact, firms often
license patents.34 And while the amount of litigation among established
competitors can be quite low for periods of time, patent battles do flare
up even among established competitors. Current examples of this include

30. See Dariush Keyhani, Patent Law in the Global Economy: A Modest Proposal for U.S.
Patent Law and Infringement Without Borders, 54 VILL. L. REV. 291, 300 (2009) (stating that
though a significant debate exists regarding whether patents are advancing their objectives as
intended, patent law does provide incentives for innovation, which increases domestic
commercialization and innovation).
31. Id. (“[T]he patent holder’s quid pro quo for disclosure is a market advantage in the form
of a legal monopoly for a limited time to commercialize the subject matter of the invention within
the United States.”).
32. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989) (“The
federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and
disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the
exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years.”); King Instruments Corp. v. Perego,
65 F.3d 941, 950 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Thus, the Patent Act creates an incentive for innovation.”);
Keyhani, supra note 30, at 293 (“It is important to note the operative language of the Act, ‘within
the U.S.,’ reflects the intent and purpose of the law: that the law provides incentive for innovation
within the U.S. territory, the territory in which the U.S. patentee (anyone who owns a U.S. patent)
is entitled to a commercial market advantage for the life of the patent as a quid pro quo for the
public disclosure of the invention.”).
33. See generally MICHAEL MILGATE, TRANSFORMING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE:
MEASURING AND MANAGING THE DRIVERS OF BUSINESS SUCCESS 299 (2004) (finding that the
patent portfolio has been rationalized due to the business costs involved in maintaining them and
the dormant or poor quality of the patents).
34. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 59
(2004) (“But innovation does proceed. It is facilitated by the widespread practice of broad ‘crosslicensing’ agreements among the major companies.”).
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lawsuits involving patents on liquid crystal displays (LCDs)35 and
smartphones.36 A number of mobile-phone makers are currently involved
in vigorous litigation over smartphone patents.37 But while some argue
that the smartphone litigation war appears much like a patent thicket,38
others note that the widespread litigation has not stopped the innovation
and distribution of mobile phones; instead, it is quite robust.39 Indeed,
given the large amount of innovation in smartphones,40 it is not surprising
35. See, e.g., Apeldyn Corp. v. AU Optronics Corp., 831 F. Supp. 2d 817 (D. Del. 2011);
Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 711 F. Supp. 2d 913 (W.D. Wis. 2010);
LG Display Co. v. AU Optronics Corp., 686 F. Supp. 2d 429 (D. Del. 2010); Honeywell Int’l,
Inc. v. Nikon Corp., 589 F. Supp. 2d 433 (D. Del. 2008); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Chi
Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 485 F. Supp. 2d 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
36. See, e.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Apple Inc.
v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 881 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Complaint and Jury Claim at 3,
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Apple Inc., 6:12-cv-06020-MAT (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2012); Complaint
and Jury Claim at 3, Eastman Kodak Co. v. High Tech Comput. Corp., 6:12-cv-06021 (W.D.N.Y.
Jan. 10, 2012); Apple Inc. v. High Tech Comput. Corp., Nos. 10-166-GMS, 10-167-GMS, 2011
WL 124446 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2011); Complaint for Patent Infringement and Declaratory Judgment
at 1, Nokia Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 09CV00791 (D. Del. Oct. 22, 2009); Research in Motion Ltd.
v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
37. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 786 F.3d 983, 989–90 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Apple won
over a $1 billion patent infringement judgment against Samsung for Samsung’s Galaxy line of
smartphones as well as Galaxy Tab computer tablet’s infringement of seven utility patents and
three design patents relating to Apple’s iPhone and iPad); Complaint for Patent Infringement at
4, Apple Inc. v. High Tech Comput. Corp., No. 1:10-cv-00167-UNA (D. Del. Mar. 2, 2010)
(Apple filed a complaint against High Tech Computer (HTC) alleging that HTC infringed on
various patents covering software and hardware in smartphones); Complaint for Patent
Infringement and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 36, at 24 (Nokia filed a complaint against
Apple alleging that Apple’s iPhone line of products infringed on numerous patents in wireless
data, speech coding, and security and encryption technologies held by Nokia).
38. Mike Masnick, Wired Takes on the Smartphone Patent Thicket and How It Stifles
Innovation, TECHDIRT (May 13, 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100513/0936579414.s
html; Simon Waterfall, Investigation: Apple vs Nokia vs Google vs HTC vs RIM, WIRED (May 12,
2010), http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2010/06/start/investigation-apple-vs-nokia-vsgoogle-vs-htc-vs-rim.
39. See, e.g., Kenneth Lustig, No, the Patent System Is Not Broken, FORBES: LEADERSHIP
FORUM (Feb. 9, 2012, 11:25 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/02/0
9/no-the-patent-system-is-not-broken/ (explaining that every technological innovation is
accompanied by patent litigation and that the amount of smartphone litigation is “actually less
than one-fifth the number suits filed during the first ‘Telephone Wars’ of Alexander Graham
Bell’s time”); David Zax, What Smartphone Makers Can Learn from the Sewing Machine Patent
War, WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Oct. 28, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/10/28/whyis-a-smartphone-like-a-sewing-machine/ (“Mossoff . . . notes that despite the litigation, the
smartphone market isn’t caught in a patent thicket yet, with production and marketing [of
smartphones] held up indefinitely as happened with the sewing machine.”).
40. Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Reassessing Tying Arrangements at the End of AT&T’s iPhone
Exclusivity, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 297, 340 (2011) (finding a “recent explosion in the number
of smartphones on the market and the number of tasks and activities that consumers perform with
these devices”); Steve Lohr, Computers That See You and Keep Watch over You, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
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that innovators would seek to enforce their patents either to protect their
devices or to receive royalty compensation for their inventions. A wellfunctioning patent system with substantial innovation and patenting
should produce substantial patent licensing.
B. Necessary Conditions for a Well-Functioning Patent System Even in
the Situation of Large Patent Portfolios
Despite active licensing, several features of the patent system
contribute to the harmful effects that can arise from large patent
portfolios. It is important to keep in mind that large patent portfolios are
not themselves a problem; they can be consistent with a well-functioning
innovation system, so long as three conditions are met: (1) patents are
issued only where the incentives to innovate or disseminate innovation
outweigh the deadweight loss from any patent monopoly pricing, 41 (2)
patent boundaries are clear,42 and (3) transaction costs are reasonably
low.43 If such conditions are present, the Coase Theorem indicates that
parties in a relevant market should be able to efficiently negotiate
property rights and interests, even in industries very crowded with
patents.44
1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/science/02see.html (describing smartphone
innovations). Using statistics in patenting as a measure of smartphone innovation indicates a great
deal of innovation. The number of mobile-related patents granted by the PTO increased by 390%
over the last decade. CHETAN SHARMA, MOBILE PATENTS LANDSCAPE: AN IN-DEPTH
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 5 (2012). The percentage of all patents that are mobile-related patents
has increased from about 2% in 1991, to 5% in 2001, and to 21% in the first quarter of 2012. Id.
Simply looking at the changes in technology used in smartphones is indicative of much
innovation. The first smartphone was the IBM Simon Personal Communicator, released in 1994,
which had a touchscreen and included features such as e-mail, calculator, clock, and a game called
Scramble. Ira Sager, Before IPhone and Android Came Simon, the First Smartphone,
BUSINESSWEEK (June 29, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-06-29/beforeiphone-and-android-came-simon-the-first-smartphone#p1. Today, there are numerous
smartphones with different operating systems manufactured by competing companies.
Smartphone users can now watch streaming video, check their bank accounts, listen to music, etc.
Trends in patenting related to smartphones are also indicative of innovation.
41. Olson, supra note 6, 192–93.
42. Id. at 236, 236 n.246.
43. Id. at 201, 228.
44. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 34, 43 (1960). To some
extent, the high technology industry seems to be an example of this. Thousands of patents can
cover complex silicon chips, yet negotiations of patent rights get done and evermore complex
chips get produced. Cf. Tyler Thorp, Comment, Testing the Limits of Patent Exhaustion’s
“Authorized Sale” Requirement Using Current High-Tech Licensing Practices, 50 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1017, 1035 (2010) (“To overcome the existence of patent thickets and promote design
freedom, high-tech companies should have flexibility in negotiating for patent peace without fear
of triggering patent exhaustion.”).
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1. Failure of Condition One: The Patent’s Benefits of Innovation Do
Not Outweigh the Costs of a Patent Monopoly
Substantial literature demonstrates current breakdowns of each of the
three conditions for a well-functioning patent system. First, in many
cases, patents seem to be issued even when they are not needed to
incentivize adequate levels of innovation.45 Business method patents
provide a prime example. While thousands of business method patents
are issued every year, there is serious doubt that the promise of a patent
is needed to prompt companies to innovate their business methods.46
After all, for the most part, competition is sufficient to spur companies to
continually improve their business methods.47 Also, new methods of
doing business generally do not involve the research and development

45. Maayan Perel, Reviving the Gatekeeping Function: Optimizing the Exclusion Potential
of Subject Matter Eligibility, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 237 (2013); Stefania Fusco, The
Patentability of Financial Methods: The Market Participants’ Perspectives, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1, 32 (2011) (“[T]he present investigation shows that after State Street, patent protection did not
appear to have produced additional innovations within the financial industry. The obvious
consequence of this finding is that the Federal Circuit was right in deciding In re Bilski because
in the past ten years, proprietary rights have been granted on financial knowledge, but society has
not received anything meaningful in return.”).
46. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle and Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business
Method Patents; 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431 (2014); Rinaldo Del Gallo, III, Are “Methods of Doing
Business” Finally out of Business as a Statutory Rejection?, 38 IDEA 403, 404 (1998) (“Further,
the business method exception is of dubious analytic value.”); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are
Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263,
274–77 (2000) (arguing that the costs imposed by business methods patents outweigh the
benefits); John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1252 (2011)
(examining why business method patents arose and acknowledging, though disagreeing with, the
view that an activist legal system brought patents into a new field where they were unnecessary);
Fusco, supra note 45, at 32 (noting that society has not received “anything meaningful in return”
for proprietary rights granted on financial knowledge); Olson, supra note 6 (arguing that some
subject matter should not be patentable because the cost exceeds the benefit, with a particular look
at business methods); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of
Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 61, 64 (1999) (“[T]he economic analysis of patent protection does not support the
extension of patent protection to methods of doing business.”); Chad King, Note, Abort, Retry,
Fail: Protection for Software-Related Inventions in the Wake of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1118, 1143 (2000) (“Scholars have criticized
the business method exception for a variety of reasons. First, courts have never properly defined
the term ‘business method.’ Furthermore, the analytic value of the exception is suspect.”
(footnotes omitted)).
47. Fusco, supra note 45, at 17–18 (“Furthermore, when asked about the factors that
specifically drove their companies to innovate, these study participants reported that the main
factor was the need to satisfy clients’ demands and generate profits. Other answers pointed more
generically to the search for opportunities to increase investment returns, build a profile, and
search for ways to get around regulations and competition.” (footnotes omitted)).
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costs that patents attempt to defray.48 Additionally, it is in society’s
interest for competitors to copy business methods.49 Finally, the
monopoly costs of business method patents can be particularly high
because allowing one competitor to control a better, more efficient, or
cheaper way of doing business prevents all competitors from providing
what may be a wide range of goods and services at the lowest price by
utilizing the efficient method.50
It is not enough to argue that the promise of a patent may provide
incentive for development. For example, a fifty-year patent term would
surely provide greater incentives to innovate than our patent system’s
current twenty-year term. Similarly, patents surely provide additional
incentives for companies to innovate with regard to their business
methods. But if the goal is to optimize the benefit to society, the question
is not whether a patent will provide additional incentive; it is whether the
innovation would have been created in the absence of that additional
incentive. If the answer is yes, then granting the additional patent
protection is a mistake.51 Many scholars have applied this analysis and
concluded that patents for business methods impose a net cost on
society.52
48. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1618 (2003) (explaining that “[b]ecause new business methods do not generally require
substantial investment in R&D, the prospect of even a modest supracompetitive reward will
provide sufficient incentive to innovate”); Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust
Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 826 (2002) (noting that internet business method patents, such
as Amazon’s “one-click” patent, are “usually simple ideas easily conceived” and therefore do not
necessitate patent protection); Olson, supra note 6, at 231 (explaining that while developing a new
drug has large research and development and Food and Drug Administration approval costs,
business methods typically do not have such costs and are instead “developed in the normal course
of business”).
49. Olson, supra note 6, at 233 (“[B]usiness methods are among those things that we most
want firms to be able to copy. The very basis of efficient markets is the ability of firms to see an
economically profitable business opportunity and move into that market so as to drive economic
profits down until all deadweight loss is squeezed out of the market and producer and consumer
surplus is maximized . . . .”).
50. Id. at 234 (“When a firm is issued a patent on a product, its rivals cannot produce that
product unless licensed to do so. When a firm is granted a patent on a method of doing business,
however, it can prevent its rivals from using the more efficient method, and make the costs of all
of its rivals’ goods relatively more expensive, thus driving up deadweight loss across an industry
instead of merely for a particular product.”).
51. Professor Robert Merges notes that some of those supporting business method patents
tend to forget that a balance is necessary rather than maximized incentive alone. See Robert P.
Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 581 (1999).
52. See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 48, at 1618–19 (“[C]ompanies have ample
incentives to develop business methods even without patent protection . . . .”); Carrier, supra note
48, at 826 (“[P]atents are not necessary for innovation in many industries.”); Dreyfuss, supra note
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Netflix provides an interesting example for the debate over business
method patents. Co-founder Reed Hastings conceived of the idea of
rental-by-mail after paying forty dollars for an overdue copy of Apollo
13.53 To develop its infrastructure, Netflix incurred significant costs in
establishing regional distribution centers.54 It spent roughly $60,000 on
computers, bar code scanners, and printers for each facility. 55 Netflix
needed to spend a large sum on marketing because DVDs were still a
relatively new technology, and competitors began to experiment with
their own online DVD rental store, cutting into Netflix’s market share.56
Although Netflix was founded in 1997, it was not profitable until the
fourth quarter of 2003.57
Blockbuster and other competitors responded to Netflix’s market
dominance by entering the market and providing their own internet sites
on which consumers could order movies.58 Although Netflix’s business
model was fairly easy to copy,59 Blockbuster was nevertheless somewhat
constrained because it worried about “cannibalizing” its retail store
revenues.60 Netflix did not have a patent on online ordering and mail
delivery of DVDs.61 It did have patents on a method for keeping a
customer’s queue of movie rental choices and on a method for allowing
customers to pay a flat fee to have a maximum number of movies out at
one time while requiring them to return a given number of movies within

46, at 276–77 (“The cost of business method patents are very high. The benefits . . . are low. The
ratio is terrible.”); Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465,
543–44 (2004) (explaining that tangible inventions have lower information costs than business
methods due to the unclear boundaries and high search costs in examining business methods);
Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method Patents: Common Sense,
Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J.
61, 75–76 (2002) (arguing that business method patents do not promote progress or innovation
and instead “raise prices and limit competition”); Raskind, supra note 46, at 64 (concluding that
“[b]oth economic theory and empirical studies of patent-intensive industries cast doubt on the
premise that patent protection of business methods is required either as an incentive for innovation
or as an ingredient of the efficient diffusion of business methods in the economy”).
53. Netflix, Inc., in 115 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES 350 (Derek
Jacques & Paula Kepos eds., 2010).
54. Id. at 353.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 351.
57. Id. at 354.
58. David J. Teece, Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation, 43 LONG RANGE
PLAN. 172, 182–83 (2010), http://www.econ.upf.edu/~lemenestrel/IMG/pdf/2_teece_on_bmi
.pdf; Greg Sandoval, Blockbuster Laughed at Netflix Partnership Offer, CNET (Dec. 9, 2010,
2:47 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-2025235-261.html.
59. Teece, supra note 58, at 183.
60. Id. at 182.
61. Id. at 183.
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a given time.62 Most analysts of Netflix believe that Netflix’s success was
founded on its creation of a new market for online mail-order DVD
rentals rather than on its patents.63 Even with its patents, Blockbuster was
able to closely copy Netflix’s method—down to the look of Netflix’s
website for selecting, prioritizing, and ordering DVDs.64 While the
patents probably did not detract from Netflix’s decision to innovate, 65
they do not seem to have been necessary either.
Thus, one sees that in some cases, such as business methods, patents
likely cost society more, in terms of patent thickets and deadweight loss
from monopoly pricing, than they provide benefits from additional
innovation. This is especially the case when the patented innovation
would have been made even without the patent incentive, given ancillary
incentives for innovation. Accordingly, at least for such unnecessary
patents, a proposal that eliminates some older or less valuable patents
could reduce holdup problems from large patent portfolios, without
substantial harm to innovation.
2. Failure of Condition Two: The Property Rights Granted by the
Patent Are Not Clear
One of the greatest threats from large patent portfolios arises from a
failure of condition two: the property rights granted by patents are often
unclear. This lack of clear patent boundaries creates harms that are well
documented by scholars in patent literature.66 The lack of an effective
notice system to inform potential infringers of a patent’s boundary,
validity, or even existence increases transaction costs, decreases
certainty, and forecloses some amount of innovation.67 Without an
62. Id.; see also U.S. Patent No. 7,024,381 (filed May 14, 2003) (approach for renting items
to customers); U.S. Patent No. 6,966,484 (filed Sept. 16, 2002) (mailing a response envelope);
U.S. Patent No. 6,584,450 (filed Apr. 28, 2000) (method and apparatus for renting items).
63. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intelllectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 367–69 (2008) (arguing that the patents were not a main
factor in Netflix’s success); cf. Teece, supra note 58, at 183 (explaining the potential factors in
Netflix’s success, including its patents).
64. Teece, supra note 58, at 183.
65. But cf. Jay Dratler, Jr., Does Lord Darcy Yet Live? The Case Against Software and
Business-Method Patents, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 823, 875 (2003) (arguing that because there
is market risk but not technological risk associated with implementing business methods, and
market risk is not typically avoided by monopoly, patenting business methods is inefficient).
66. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14; Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent
Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523 (2010); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure
and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2013).
67. See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 79–84 (2012); BESSEN & MEURER,
supra note 14, at 46–62; Richard A. Epstein & F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and
Wisdom of Compulsory Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 71, 76 (2011)
(recognizing defects in the patent system, one being the “obscure boundary lines for individual
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effective notice system, similar to the one found in real property, potential
inventors must risk waiting until litigation before a court determines
whether an invention falls within the boundaries of a patent.68
Patent boundaries are generally fuzzy.69 Unlike the boundaries for real
property, it is difficult to map the words in a patent claim to real
technologies given the variance in claim interpretation and the possibility
of the doctrine of equivalents extending the reach of written claims.70 As
Professor Colleen Chien points out in one example, smartphones can
have many different names, such as a “mobile device” or “personal digital
assistant.”71 Variance in terminology and the sheer number of patents
surrounding smartphone technology makes it difficult to determine which
patents cover potential new technology.72
Further, while there is a presumption that a one-to-one ratio of patent
to invention exists, this is not always the case.73 Instead, many patents
can cover a single innovation product, and many inventions can stem
from a single patent.74 The Kodak v. Polaroid case is instructive here.75
The research and development department of Kodak studied over 250
patents while attempting to work around Polaroid’s instant photo
technology.76 Once Kodak finished and commercialized its product,
Polaroid sued, citing over twenty claims from numerous patents, and
won.77 Despite receiving many legal opinions from counsel throughout
the development process, Kodak was still sued, with the result that it had
patents [that] make it difficult for other entrepreneurs to know whether their activities infringe on
someone else’s patents”); Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L.
REV. 1047, 1098 (2009) (“Unlike the clear boundaries of real property, the legal boundaries of
patents are notoriously unclear unless and until litigated.”).
68. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 46, 53. But see Adam Mossoff, The Trespass
Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1690–91, 1695–96 (2013) (arguing that the
application of the trespass standard to show that a lack of stable boundaries has resulted in an
increase in patent litigation is “conceptually invalid and empirically unverified”).
69. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 53.
70. See id.
71. See Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 290 (2011).
72. See id. (noting that the Federal Trade Commission identified trouble in sorting through
patents as a major hurdle information technology sector firms face).
73. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 53. Limits exist, however, for how far the bounds
can reach, which are grounded in the invention itself. See FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 84.
74. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 797 (2007) (opining that “[m]ore and more products
incorporate not a single new invention but a combination of many different components, each of
which may be the subject of one or more patents”).
75. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1481, 1990 WL 324105
(D. Mass. 1990).
76. See id. at *76.
77. See id. at *1.
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to exit the instant photography market.78
The problem, as James Bessen and Professor Michael Meurer
demonstrate, is that these legal opinions hold no weight—true claim
construction cannot begin until the patent is in front of a judge. 79 Even
when patent boundaries are contested in court, individual judges can
construe claims differently.80 Bessen and Meurer argue that because
problems in determining patent boundaries are so severe, the patent
system makes every industry worse off save one—pharmaceuticals.81
Second, it is often impossible to know a patent’s validity without
initiating litigation.82 While patents granted by the PTO are presumed to
be valid,83 scholars contest the value of this presumption.84 Given the
high number of mistakes and the relatively little time the PTO can spend
on patent examination, many “bad” patents are granted.85 Regardless,
potential inventors may spend countless hours inventing around a patent,
only for a court to later find infringement anyway.86 To find a patent
invalid, the PTO in a post-grant or inter partes review, or a judge during
litigation, must examine it.87 In the Kodak case, the court found several
78. See id. at *1, *84; BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 48. It is an open question
currently whether Apple will be able effectively to force Samsung out of the smartphone market
given the $1 billion judgment for patent infringement that Apple won. Youkyung Lee, Apple
Victory Means Soul-Searching for Samsung, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2012),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-08-28/samsung-future-whats-next/57364050/1.
79. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 50–51; see also Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996) (holding that judges must construe patent claims);
Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 29–30 (2010) (“Accordingly, claim
construction—interpreting the meaning and scope of claims—often determines the outcome of
patent litigation.”).
80. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 237.
81. See id. at 106–07 (arguing that only in the pharmaceutical industry do firms get more
benefit from patent exclusivity than they pay in costs of defending and protecting against others’
patents).
82. See id. at 50.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012).
84. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 133; Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley,
Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47 (2007).
85. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 84, at 46–47 (“Given all this, it is hardly a surprise that
the PTO makes mistakes during the initial process of patent review, granting patents that, on the
merits, should never have been issued.”); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001) (“The PTO has come under attack of late for failing
to do a serious job of examining patents, thus allowing bad patents to slip through the system.”).
86. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 50 (using a Kodak case as an example); see
also Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1332 (“Even if a potential user discovers a patent that has been issued,
she must still determine not only whether the patent claim covers the desired use, but also whether
the patent itself is even valid.”).
87. Francisco Castro, The America Invents Act and Nanotechnology, 8 NANOTECHNOLOGY
L. & BUS. 214, 218 (2011–2012) (“The post-grant review provides an opportunity, albeit one with
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of Polaroid’s patents invalid during the course of litigation.88 If Kodak
knew that the court would find these patents invalid, it would not have
devoted time to inventing around them, and could have instead devoted
more time to inventing around the patents it was eventually held to have
infringed.89 High information and transaction costs, indeed.
Further complicating the task of designing around competitors’
patents, uncertainty surrounding patent ownership, or the extent of an
entity’s patent portfolio, may not come to light before litigation. 90 Thus,
a firm can never be sure that it has reviewed all of the relevant patents of
its competitors. Firms also can use continuation patents to create “hidden
claims” that will only be issued after a competitor has brought a product
to market.91 Moreover, because infringement is determined at the time of
infringement, not at the time of filing, “claim terms are allowed to change
meaning over time as technology advances.”92 This means that patents
can end up being infringed by products in technological areas that did not
previously exist.93
Scholars have proposed numerous solutions to these problems.94 For
example, to solve the boundary and validity uncertainties, Bessen and
Professor Meurer propose a procedural reform that would give inventors
an opportunity for early, cost-effective review of a patent’s merits.95 This
a narrow window of time, to invalidate the claims of a patent soon after issuance and without
having to go through costly litigation.”).
88. See Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1481, 1990 WL
324105, at *1 (D. Mass. 1990) (“Two patents were found invalid. One was found not infringed.
One was found invalid before trial and Polaroid withdrew its claims on another patent before
trial.”).
89. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 48; Nathan P. Anderson, Striking a Balance:
The Pursuit of Transparent Patent Ownership, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 395 (2015) (arguing that
“[c]oncealed and misleading patent ownership information imposes substantial costs on the patent
system through both persistent litigation and increased transaction costs.”).
90. See Chien, supra note 71, at 289 (“[T]he task of searching for relevant patents is
daunting.”).
91. Hidden claims arise when applicants file a patent application then wait to see the
direction technology is moving before writing claims that will intentionally cover a broad range
of inventions. Bessen and Professor Meurer point out the Rambus example of a firm that
participated in an industry’s standard-setting organization while secretly pursuing a patent on the
same technology. They used information from the organization to draft the broadest claims
possible after the standard was set, locking firms into an unfavorable bargaining position. See
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 62.
92. See id. at 67 (emphasis omitted).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 238–39; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note
14, at 131; FELDMAN, supra note 67, at 84; Chien, supra note 72, at 287–88; Lichtman & Lemley,
supra note 85, at 72; Mark R. Patterson, Inventions, Industry Standards, and Intellectual Property,
17 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. 1043, 1046 (2002); Lemley, supra note 85, at 1496.
95. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 237.
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would occur in two steps. First, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit would defer to the PTO or trial court for claim interpretation,
which would centralize construction and increase predictability.96
Second, the PTO would have the power to draft legal opinions regarding
claim construction so that any party could approach the PTO and request
an opinion regarding any new technology.97 With an authoritative opinion
in hand stating exactly what the boundaries of a patent are, innovators
would be free to work around these boundaries without fear of
prosecution.98
Another method of eliminating uncertainty around validity involves
mitigating the presumption of validity under § 282.99 Professors Doug
Lichtman and Mark A. Lemley offer three proposals to solve validity
uncertainty: (1) lower an infringer’s evidentiary standard of rebuttal from
“clear and convincing” to “preponderance of the evidence”; (2) allow
applicants to pay more for an increase in patent protection, essentially
creating a presumption in favor of validity; or (3) similar to Bessen and
Meurer’s proposal, grant legal weight and deference to any PTO
reexamination of a patent in later judicial proceedings.100
Until a formal proposal is adopted, however, firms must mitigate
uncertainty risks through alternative means. Firms with large patent
portfolios may mitigate their risk from competitors simply through the
threat of a countersuit.101 If a patent holder believes there is a legitimate
chance of a countersuit from the owner of a rival patent portfolio, the
potential of mutually assured destruction will likely deter the former from
initiating a suit.102
Even if a firm has not invested the time and research into building a
large patent portfolio to use defensively, it may be equipped to buy one
if it has the funds. Consider Google’s $900 million bid on Nortel’s patent
portfolio.103 Google, at the time, was not equipped with sufficient patent
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 14, at 133; Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 85, at 49
(“Our proposal, therefore, aims not to improve the overall quality of PTO review, but instead to
change the presumption of patent validity to more accurately reflect the realities of current patent
practice. The goal is to discourage the filing of bad but not good patents, and at the same time to
empower the PTO to better distinguish between the two. Our overall point is not that patents
should never be accorded a strong favorable presumption. It is instead that presumptions must be
earned.” (footnote omitted)).
100. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 85, at 49–50.
101. See Grant C. Yang, The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open Source
Movement, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 198 (2005).
102. Id.
103. Claire Cain Miller, Google Bids $900 Million for Nortel Patent Assets, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/technology/05google.html.
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protection to ward off companies such as Apple or Microsoft during the
smartphone wars.104 The purchase of the Nortel patents, it stated, would
dissuade other companies from suing Google.105 Unfortunately for
Google, a consortium including Apple, Microsoft, and Research in
Motion bought the Nortel patents for $4.5 billion.106 Thereafter, Google
bought Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion, gaining Motorola’s nearly
20,000 patents as part of the deal.107
But not all entities have the funds to purchase patent protection, and
they may instead be anticompetitively deterred or coerced into
unfavorable licensing agreements with patent holders.108 Since patent
owners are under no obligation to license their work, they may use their
right to exclude others from practicing the invention in any capacity
without invoking an antitrust violation.109 As long as the patent holder is
not using its patent to extend its monopoly into other markets or in other
ways that would violate the per se or “rule of reason” antitrust tests, the
patent holder is free to exclude any and all potential licensees or to charge
whatever it would like for use of the invention.110 This can deter small or
upcoming firms that cannot afford expensive licensing fees from using
necessary technology, forcing them to exit the market.111 This cost to new

104. See id.
105. See Miller, supra note 103.
106. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Consortium Led by Apple Buys Nortel’s Patents for $4.5 Billion,
FORTUNE (July 1, 2011), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/07/01/consortium-led-by-apple-buysnortels-patents-for-4-5-billion/.
107. Matthew Panzarino, Google Keeps ‘Vast Majority’ of Motorola Mobility Patents in Sale
to Lenovo, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 29, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/01/29/google-keeps-vastmajority-of-motorola-mobility-patents-in-sale-to-lenovo/.
108. See generally Patterson, supra note 29, at 1140–41 (arguing that understanding the
distinction between products and inventions is a key to addressing the so-called “leveraging
problem”).
109. See United States v. Gen. Elec., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997); Patterson, supra note 29, at 1133–34
(“In Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Ninth Circuit held that although
an intellectual property owner’s desire to profit from leveraging its intellectual property
is presumptively legitimate, the presumption can be rebutted.”).
110. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 989 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D. Kan. 1997)
(“Xerox’s legal right to exclude [independent service organizations] in the service markets from
using Xerox’s patented inventions arose from its patents, not from an unlawful leveraging of its
monopoly power in the parts market.”).
111. Melissa E. Horn, Note, DNA Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the
Balance Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 275 (2002–03) (“Licensing, while
not as prohibitive as exclusive licensing, can still retard new information and technologies when
it is cost prohibitive. Patent holders can refuse to grant researchers licenses altogether, and when
researchers are given the opportunity to purchase licenses, the patent holders set the terms usually
charging ‘both an upfront usage fee and a per test fee, often at rates that small diagnostic
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firms is only worthwhile if the inventing and commercializing that results
from the patent incentive is greater than the cost to society in decreased
competition. As has been shown above, this is often not the case given
fuzzy patent boundaries and large patent portfolios that can be used to
deter competing innovation. A proposal that reduced the number of
patents that need to be considered in inventing around competitor’s
patents, or in establishing freedom to operate without threat of suit, would
help to mitigate some of the costs of the patent system.
3. Failure of Condition Three: Transaction Costs Are High
Where property boundaries are uncertain, transaction costs will
necessarily be higher.112 The buyer and the seller cannot assign a fair
value to a patent until they know its boundaries—a process that, as
explained above, can be quite costly.113 This is not a problem that two
parties can simply negotiate away. The patent’s value is determined by
how every other market participant perceives its boundaries. Even if the
buyer and seller reach a mutual agreement as to the patent’s property
boundaries, they cannot guarantee that other would-be infringers and
courts will agree on those boundaries.114
Even when property boundaries are clear, which is often not the case,
having too many property rights to negotiate can cause aggregate
transaction costs to be high and thus can deter parties from engaging in
otherwise mutually beneficial agreements. As explained above, some
patent law scholars refer to industries or technological fields that are very
crowded with patent rights as “thickets.”115 To the extent that the thicket
is too dense, then absent transaction cost minimizing strategies such as
patent pooling or tailored clearance markets, socially beneficial

laboratories cannot afford.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Vida Foubister, Gene Patents Raise
Concerns for Researchers, Clinicians, AM. MED. NEWS (2000))).
112. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 71–72.
113. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
114. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 107 (“[C]hemical patents might provide
stronger exclusion because they might be more likely to be successfully enforced. Conversely,
patents on components of complex systems . . . might be less valuable because complex
interactions between components might make the boundaries of each component less clear.”).
115. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott
Stern eds., 2001) (“Mixing metaphors, thoughtful observers are increasingly expressing concerns
that our patent (and copyright) system is in fact creating a patent thicket, a dense web of
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way through in order to
actually commercialize new technology.”); Mossoff, supra note 18, at 166–67 (“A ‘patent thicket’
exists when too many patents covering individual elements of a commercial product are separately
owned by different entities.”).
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innovation and competition will not occur.116
4. Failure of These Conditions Can Create an Environment Where
Holders of Large Patent Portfolios Can Abuse Their Power
Because of the failure of the conditions necessary for a wellfunctioning patent system, firms with large patent portfolios can engage
in behaviors that are undeniably harmful to society. Large firms may use
their patent portfolios as cudgels to aggressively impose costs in the form
of threats of suit or actual patent lawsuits against their upstart rivals, even
when there are not strong patent infringement arguments. By repeatedly
threatening suit with one patent after another in their portfolios, large
firms can impose crippling costs on start-ups and small businesses,
causing them to need more financing than anticipated to get to their next
stage of growth.117 If such additional financing is not forthcoming—and
threats of patent litigation tend to deter financing118—then start-ups and
small firms may go out of business or be sold for a discount. While larger
players buy start-ups all the time,119 some start-ups do not get acquired
and instead grow to be formidable competitors that offer better products
and services or cheaper prices.120 Ownership of large patent portfolios by
aggressive, established firms, combined with the boundary and notice
problems that surround patents and make it difficult to know when a
patent might be infringed,121 gives large firms significant, non-socially
116. See Shapiro, supra note 115, at 121 (“The vast number of patents currently being issued
creates a very real danger that a single product or service will infringe on many patents. Worse
yet, many patents cover products or processes already being widely used when the patent is issued,
making it harder for the companies actually building businesses and manufacturing products to
invent around these patents. Add in the fact that a patent holder can seek injunctive relief, that is,
can threaten to shut down the operations of the infringing company, and the possibility for holdup
becomes all too real.”).
117. Neeraj Arora, Disabling Patentability for Skill-Based Inventions: Aligning Patent Law
with Competition Policy, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 12 (2005)
(“Furthermore, the patent holder can use their patent rights to threaten expensive litigation, which
may deter venture capital financing and allow the patent holder to maintain their societally
inefficient position.”).
118. Id.
119. Stephen J. Redner, Thinking of Going Public? Think Twice, Then Read the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 521, 528 (2002) (“As for existing companies
seeking alternatives to raising capital by going public, a company may allow itself to be bought
out by another as many startups have sold out to Microsoft and other giants.”); Eliot Spitzer,
Capital Flight, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB116502041205838610.html (“Today, however, nearly 90% of those venture-capital-backed
startups are sold to strategic buyers in private transactions.”).
120. See, e.g., Fred Vogelstein, How Yahoo Blew It, WIRED (Feb. 2007)
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/15.02/yahoo.html (discussing how Yahoo’s decision not to
purchase Google allowed Google to grow on its own and develop the concept of AdWords).
121. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
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beneficial power to intimidate or crush upstart rivals.122 Such uses of
patents contravene patent policy and erode competition, which is the
backbone of a market economy.123 While this use of large portfolios may
seem obviously abusive, so long as they can pass the lax Rule 11 test for
stating a colorable claim,124 the rational firm that seeks to maximize
shareholder return will probably consider itself under a fiduciary
obligation to consider bludgeoning potential competitors with weak
patents, just one of its many profit-maximizing tools.125
It is even easier for non-practicing entities (NPEs) to abuse large
patent portfolios because NPEs do not face the same threat that small
practitioners do.126 As they are not actively practicing the invention, they
are not at risk of infringement.127 This leaves NPEs free to license their
patents while suing others who may infringe their patents.128
C. Characteristics of Large Patent Portfolio Holders
Before attempting to design a proper maintenance fee structure, it is
important to understand which organizations own large patent portfolios
and how those organizations use their portfolios. The entities holding the
most expansive patent portfolios are large corporations that own
numerous patents in the fields in which they offer goods and services.
122. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1255, 1315 (2009) (“Suits
may come in the form of ‘bullying’ by larger competitors trying to put the startup out of
business.”).
123. Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the Close
Association Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 90 (1989) (“The backbone of the United States
market economy is competition.”).
124. Jonathan L. Moore, Particularizing Patent Pleading: Pleading Patent Infringement in
a Post-Twombly World, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 451, 486 (2010) (“Further, the scope of a
patent’s claim is typically ambiguous and it is difficult to know with any certainty how a court
will construe it. This fact benefits nuisance-value plaintiffs, as it allows them to bring actions that
lack merit but satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 11.” (footnote omitted)); Ranganath
Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 25 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 176–77 (2008) (“The ambiguous nature of patent claim scope
is a boon for nuisance-value patent plaintiffs, because it allows them to file suits which, though
not meritorious enough to prevail at trial and through appeal, are sufficient to comply with the
pre-filing requirements of Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 11(b).”).
125. Cf. Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1289–90 (2001) (providing examples of illegal corporate actions consistent with the
financial interest of the corporation).
126. See Yang, supra note 101, at 198 (“A NPE would not be at risk of being sued because
they would be outside the industry while still able to enforce their patent portfolios against a larger
company.”).
127. Id.
128. See id.
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One step down is patent assertion entities (sometimes referred to as patent
“trolls”)—organizations that accumulate patents not for product
development, but to exact licensing fees and litigation settlements.
The largest patent portfolios are found in the high-technology
industry, in both hardware and software companies. Measuring by issued
patents from 1994 through 2011,129 IBM had the most U.S. patents—
58,692. No other firm has come close: Samsung Electronics holds the
next largest patent portfolio, totaling 40,548 patents. Canon K.K. is just
behind with 34,132 patents issued. After the top three, there is a
significant drop. Sony Corporation, Toshiba Corporation, Hitachi, and
Fujitsu each held some 21,000 to 25,000 patents issued in those years.
Next are the computer and software firms, with Intel, NEC, Micron, and
Microsoft each having between about 17,000 and 20,000 patents issued
from 1994 through 2011. Three large and highly diversified firms then
show up on the list. Siemens had 18,887 patents issued; GE had 17,483
patents issued; and Mitsubishi had 15,499 patents issued. Beyond that,
more software and computer companies appear on the list. Hewlett–
Packard, Seiko Epson, Texas Instruments, and Xerox each had between
12,000 and 14,000 patents issued in the period studied.130
When it comes to NPEs, or “trolls,” Intellectual Ventures stands head
and shoulders above the rest with an estimated 25,000 U.S. patents, 4400
patent applications, and a total of 70,000 patents and applications
worldwide.131 Intellectual Ventures both applies for its own patents and
acquires them from others.132 It has reported that it files roughly 500 new
patent applications each year.133 All other NPEs have just a fraction of
the patents held by Intellectual Ventures.134 Only two other NPEs are
believed to have more than 1000 patents in their portfolios: Round Rock
is estimated to have 3495 U.S. patent publications135 and 1186 patent
129. See infra Appendix.
130. While some firms publicly proclaim the size of their patent portfolios, for those that do
not, it can be hard to obtain exact figures on how many patents a particular firm owns, but attempts
to determine portfolio size can be made by looking at data from a number of sources, including
Securities and Exchange Commission filings, a firm’s own statements, and patent office statistics
on issued patents. I have done this in making the estimates found in this Article.
131. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 25;
Largest
Patent
Holdings,
PATENTFREEDOM
(2014),
https://web.archive.org/web/
20141113191732/https://www.patentfreedom.com/about-npes/holdings/; Our Patent Portfolio,
INTELLECTUAL
VENTURES,
http://www.intellectualventures.com/inventions-patents/patentportfolio/ (last visited March 31, 2016).
132. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 131, at 20–21.
133. Id. at 6.
134. See Largest Patent Holdings, supra note 131.
135. See id. Patent publications are issued patents and patent applications that the PTO
publishes eighteen months after the patent is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2012).
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families.136 Interdigital is estimated to have 3989 U.S. patent publications
and 1537 patent families.137 Other NPEs are estimated to have less than
1000 patents each in their portfolios, with patent publications ranging
from a few hundred to just under a thousand.138
Thus, one sees that the entities with the largest patent portfolios by far
are entities that are actively involved in producing goods and services
related to their patents. For all of the alarm that they cause, most NPEs
have relatively modest patent portfolios compared to the largest
practicing entities.
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: A MAINTENANCE FEE STRUCTURE THAT
DISCOURAGES LARGE PORTFOLIOS OF NON-PRACTICED PATENTS
In light of the contemporary problems in patent law, this Article
proposes a solution. The proposal entails creating tiered maintenance fee
enhancements that will discourage patent holders from accumulating
large portfolios of non-practiced patents. Furthermore, to effectuate this
proposal, this Article suggests requiring disclosure of related entities,
portfolio size, and which patents are practiced—resulting in additional
benefits beyond discouraging large portfolios of non-practiced patents.
A. Proposal: Tie Maintenance Fees to the Number of Non-practiced
Patents Held by the Patent Owner
At first glance, it appears the solution is simple: If non-practicing
entities are imposing net costs on society with their large patent
portfolios, then society should pass these costs onto the non-practicing
entities—society should increase the price of being a non-practicing
entity with a large portfolio. At the same time, if firms that actively use
their patents (practicing entities) can hold large patent portfolios at a net
benefit to society, then society should not impose additional costs on
136. Largest Patent Holdings, supra note 131. Patent families are groups of related patents,
i.e., continuations or divisionals of original patent applications. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (granting
applications disclosed by Section 112(a) in an earlier application the benefit of the earlier
application’s filing date); John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 454 (2004)
(“This result is also confirmed by the relationship between litigation and the number of related
patents issued from the same original application as the patent in the dataset, which we refer to as
a patent family.”). Patent families can become fairly large over time, with a dozen or more patents
in the family. Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and
Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 723 (2010) (“Some patents issue from a
single application, with a single prosecution history. Other patents are members of large families
of related patents, with a web of underlying patent applications, along with counterparts filed in
foreign countries.”).
137. Largest Patent Holdings, supra note 131.
138. See id.
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them. If, however, companies with many non-practiced patents in their
portfolios ultimately impose costs on society regardless of whether they
practice some of their patents, then these costs should be imposed on all
companies with large portfolios.
The current patent system charges patent owners fees at different
times and for different reasons.139 A would-be patent owner must pay a
fee to file a patent application, to have the PTO conduct a prior art search
and examine the patent application, and to have the PTO issue a patent
once it has determined that the invention is patentable.140 Then, the patent
owner must pay regular maintenance fees to maintain the patent in force
until its expiration.141 Specifically, a patent owner who wishes to
maintain the patent for its full, twenty-year life must pay maintenance
fees 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after the PTO issues the patent.142 If the
owner misses a payment, the patent lapses into the public domain and
ceases to be enforceable.143 These maintenance fees serve two purposes:
(1) to collect revenues to fund the PTO, and (2) to encourage patent
owners to let lapse patents that are of little value—specifically, those of
less value than the maintenance fees. By taking low-value patents out of
force sooner, society benefits because others can use and build on the
formerly patented technology without having to worry about being sued.
Traditionally, Congress set the fees for patent examination and
maintenance directly in the patent statute.144 The AIA, however,
delegated this authority to the PTO.145 Thus, the PTO now has, for the
first time, the authority to set all fees associated with patent examination,
grant, and maintenance.146 Pursuant to this authority, the PTO has
lowered the fees for filing a patent, performing a prior art search, and
issuing the patent.147 Conversely, the PTO has raised the fees for
139. 35 U.S.C. § 41.
140. There are also a number of fees that will be charged for certain things related to the
patent examination process. For instance, patent applicants must pay additional fees for each of
the following: requesting prioritized examination, filing excess claims with the patent application,
requesting an extension to respond to PTO actions, requesting continued examination, appealing
a decision of the PTO, and requesting a supplemental examination. See id.
141. Id. § 41(b).
142. Id. § 41(b)(1).
143. Id. § 41(b)(2). There is a six-month grace period during which the maintenance fee may
be paid, although a surcharge may be required at the discretion of the Director. Id. After this grace
period, the patent expires. Id.
144. See id. § 41.
145. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–20
(2011).
146. Id. at § 11.
147. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE FEE
SETTING REPORT 8 (2012), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/120924ppac-fee-setting-report2.pdf.
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maintaining patents in force.148 The PTO has stated that its goal is to shift
costs from when the patent’s value is uncertain—before issuance—to
when an owner is better able to calculate the patent’s value—after
issuance.149 This seems logical: fees can only serve their function of
deterring the patenting of less valuable innovations if the patent owner
has enough information on the patent’s value to assess whether the patent
is worth more than the fees.
The PTO’s inclination to increase maintenance fees to clear some
patent congestion is sensible. This Article proposes that the PTO go
further and use its fee-setting authority not only to discourage the
maintenance of low-value patents, but also to address more directly the
problems of industry participants and patent trolls holding large
portfolios of non-practiced patents as well as the attendant public
uncertainty as to which patents are being practiced. This Article proposes
that the PTO implement maintenance fee enhancements based on the
number of non-practiced patents in a holder’s portfolio. The precise
structure and thresholds for the fees are of secondary importance; the key
is that the PTO create tiered maintenance fee enhancements so as to
discourage large low-value patent portfolios. One would expect the PTO
to regularly review and adjust the tiers and enhancement values to
achieve the correct balance.
The PTO should establish a progressive system of maintenance fee
enhancements, assessing no fee enhancement on portfolios below a
certain size. The PTO should also create tiered fee enhancements
positively correlated to the number of patents that do not cover goods or
services made directly by the patent owner or by an entity that it controls.
The PTO’s definition of patent portfolio should include patents held by
any parent, subsidiary, or related entities with common ownership.
Ideally, maintenance fee enhancements will not begin until the 7.5year renewal date. As the PTO has noted, patent applicants are often
uncertain as to the value of their invention at the time of filing and even
at the time of issuance.150 The majority of patents are never
commercialized.151 Even many patents that do become valuable do not
148. See id. at 8.
149. See id. at 12–13.
150. See id. at 13.
151. Sichelman, supra note 8, at 362–63 (“As an empirical matter, it appears that less,
probably much less, than half of all patented product inventions are commercialized. In addition
to several surveys reporting roughly 50% commercialization rates, patentees fail to pay
maintenance fees on more than 60% of patents within twelve years after issuance. Unless a
product was a complete flop, in many industries, it would have likely survived for at least twelve
years in one form or another. Thus, notwithstanding the absent-mindedness of some patentees (or
their lawyers) who fail to renew their valuable patents, these low renewal rates are strong evidence
that most patented inventions are never commercialized.” (footnotes omitted)).
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do so immediately, but rather become valuable only after the patent
owner makes further investments of time and money to refine the
invention so that it is cost effective to produce and market.152 Charging a
patent owner substantial maintenance fees before it knows the value of
its patent may decrease the incentive to innovate and delay marketing of
new innovations, especially those with uncertain market prospects. The
patent owner should generally have a good idea of the patent’s value by
the 7.5-year maintenance payment deadline. The fee is due 7.5 years after
issuance, not after filing.153 Because patent examination is a slow
process154 and the PTO has a substantial backlog of patent applications,155
the PTO generally takes several years to issue a patent.156 Thus, the
maintenance fee due 7.5 years after issuance may not come due until ten
years or more after the applicant files the patent. Because the patent

152. See Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and Its Continued Viability in Light
of the Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393, 396–97 (2009) (stating that
value is gained from a patent by actually practicing or producing the invention, or licensing if
manufacture is not possible); cf. Kristal M. Wicks, Note, Exhausted or Unlicensed: Can Field-ofUse Restrictions in Biotech License Agreements Still Prevent Off-Label Use Promotion After
Quanta Computer?, 9 U.N.H. L. REV. 157, 162 (2010) (“In most situations, other entities can
manufacture, market, or sell an invention better than the patent owner, and the ability to license
the invention increases both the value of the specific invention and the general value of inventive
efforts because it provides an incentive for people to make inventions regardless of their ability
to successfully bring a product to market.”).
153. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 (2015).
154. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 32 (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
USPTOFY15PAR.pdf (reporting that the average first action pendency in 2011 was 17.3 months,
and the total average pendency was 26.6 months); Dennis Crouch, Addressing the USPTO
Backlog, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/backlog-downand-up.html [hereinafter Crouch, Addressing] (noting that on average, an application today
receives a first action within 23 months). But Crouch also notes that total application pendency
could be longer than reported, because “any request for continued examination (RCE) is counted
as an abandonment of an application and a refilling of a new application.” Dennis Crouch,
Average
Patent
Application
Pendency,
PATENTLY-O
(Dec.
12,
2011),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/12/average-patent-application-pendency.html
[hereinafter Crouch, Average Patent Application] (explaining that the PTO’s figures may be
higher than reported).
155. There are currently 1,147,595 pending utility, plant, and reissue applications. See U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 154, at 162, tbl. 5; see also Crouch, Addressing, supra
note 154 (explaining that an increase in the backlog of applications awaiting examination
following an RCE actually causes the decrease in unexamined non-provisional patent applications
over the past two years, which is roughly 82,000).
156. See Crouch, Average Patent Applicationy, supra note 154 (“The median pendency is 34 years”); Crouch, Addressing, supra note 154 (noting that the PTO estimates applications will
receive action twenty-three months after being filed).
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applicant obtains priority as of the date of filing,157 the applicant need not
wait for issuance before commercializing the innovation. Accordingly,
for most patents, about ten years should be more than adequate to
determine whether a patent is valuable and worth keeping in force.
For patent portfolios below a certain size, there will be no
maintenance fee enhancements. For patent portfolios above the threshold,
the maintenance fee due at the 7.5 and 11.5-year payment dates will be
multiplied based on the size of the non-practiced patent portfolio owned
by the party paying the maintenance fee. The suggested enhancements
are set out in Table 1, but again, the exact numbers are not as important
as the tiered approach, and the amounts should be adjusted based on
experience. As one can see from Table 1, there are no maintenance fee
enhancements for patent portfolios containing 100 or fewer non-practiced
patents.158
Table 1: Large Entities
Unused
Patents
in Portfolio

PTO’s 7.5Year
Maintenance
Fee159

Proposed 7.5Year
Multiplier

PTO’s 11.5Year
Maintenance
Fee160

Proposed
11.5-Year
Multiplier

< 100

$3600

None

$7400

None

100–1000

$3600

X2=$7200

$7400

X2=$14,800

1000–2000

$3600

X3= $10,800

$7400

X3=$22,200

2000–5000

$3600

X4=$14,400

$7400

X4=$29,600

5000–10,000

$3600

X5=$18,000

$7400

X5=$37,000

10,000–15,000

$3600

X6=$21,600

$7400

X6=$44,400

15,000–20,000

$3600

X7=$25,200

$7400

X7=$51,800

20,000–25,000

$3600

X8=$28,800

$7400

X8=$59,200

157. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Note, however, that the patent statute allows for slight
extension of the patent term due to issues such as patent office delay. Id. § 154(b). Under the AIA,
patents filed after March 16, 2013, will have priority as of the date of filing. See Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 102(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 286 (2011). For patents filed
before that date, their presumptive priority is from the date of filing, but patentees may push their
priority date back to their invention date so long as certain requirements are met. See 35 U.S.C. §
102.
158. The threshold of 100 non-practiced patents is fairly arbitrary, but it does correspond
with the number of patents in a portfolio that Patent Freedom asserts can be evaluated for
infringement without undue effort and expense. See Largest Patent Holdings, supra note 131.
159. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(7) (2015).
160. Id. § 1.20(g).
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25,000–30,000

$3600

X9=$32,400

$7400

X9=$66,600

> 30,000

$3600

X10=$36,000

$7400

X10=$74,000

The PTO currently charges “small entities” half of what it charges
“large entities” to maintain a patent.161 The proposed fee enhancements
follow this same ratio, as illustrated by Table 2.162
Table 2: Small Entities
Unused
Patents
in Portfolio
< 100
100–1000
1000–2000
2000–5000
5000–10,000
10,000–15,000
15,000–20,000
20,000–25,000
25,000–30,000
> 30,000

PTO’s
7.5-Year
Maintena
nce Fee163
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800
$1800

Proposed 7.5Year Multiplier

None
X2=$3600
X3=$5400
X4=$7200
X5=$9000
X6=$10,800
X7=$12,600
X8=$14,400
X9=$16,200
X10=$18,000

PTO’s 11.5Year
Maintenance
Fee164
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700
$3700

Proposed 11.5Year Multiplier

None
X2=$7400
X3=$11,100
X4=$14,800
X5=$18,500
X6=$22,200
X7=$25,900
X8=$29,600
X9=$33,300
X10=$37,000

B. “Practiced” Versus “Non-practiced” Patents
Part of this Article’s proposal involves distinguishing between
“practiced” and “non-practiced” patents in a portfolio. In this Article, a
non-practiced patent refers to a patent that does not cover any products
or services provided by the patent owner or any entity under its common
ownership. Patents merely licensed to others but not used by the owner

161. To qualify as a “small entity,” the patent owner must be an individual, a nonprofit, or a
small business that meets the size requirements set forth in 13 C.F.R. § 121.801–05 (2015). See
35 U.S.C. § 41(h); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE,
9 MPEP app. R § 1.27 (9th ed., 2014). The standards vary depending on the industry.
162. There is no need to consider “micro entities” because this Article’s proposal would not
affect them. To qualify as a micro entity, an inventor must have filed no more than four previous
patents and may not have assigned any patent being prosecuted. See 35 U.S.C. § 123(a) (defining
the qualities of a micro entity).
163. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(f).
164. Id. § 1.20(g).
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to make products or services are counted as non-practiced patents.165 This
holds even for patents on inventions that are genuinely innovative and
may be of benefit to society. Any other formulation would fail to deter
patent trolling, as patent trolls often license their patents.166
Narrowly defining practiced patents as those directly used provides a
bright-line rule and thus reduces administrative burdens for the PTO. This
definition also tends to redirect patents to owners who will utilize them,
which benefits society. The entity making use of the patented technology
is generally the entity best able to value the patent and thus the entity best
able to make economically optimal decisions regarding the patent.
Maintenance fees also redirect patents away from trolls—who often
attempt to monetize a patent not by marketing the patent’s innovation,
but by extracting fees from those using the patented methods when no
copying occurred.167 The broad definition of non-practiced patents carries
certain benefits as well. It prevents patent owners from evading fee
enhancements through sham licenses—e.g., issuing licenses for
negligible amounts simply to avoid the fee enhancement.
Some might object that maintenance fee enhancements have the unfair
effect of pressuring good-faith inventors who are not easily able to
commercialize their patents, such as universities, to sell the patents and
thus forego revenues from potential licensing deals if others later also
want to use the patented technology.168 This should not be the case,
however, given the sophisticated deals that parties can negotiate to
address these concerns. For instance, the sale of a patent 169 can be

165. Note that direct use could include use when the patent owner is one of a number of
manufacturers in a manufacturing process that makes something covered by the patent. Likewise,
the owner of a method patent would be using it directly if the owner were part of a group of
entities that provides necessary steps to a patented method. See generally Robin M. Davis, Note,
Failed Attempts to Dwarf the Patent Trolls: Permanent Injunctions in Patent Infringement Cases
Under the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 and eBay v. Mercexchange, 17 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 431, 438 (2008) (discussing these questionable licensing practices as those of the
patent troll).
166. See id. (stating that the licensing practices of patent trolls “drive up the price of new
consumer technology because manufacturing corporations forced to take licenses on a troll’s
patents often pass the costs of royalty payments and patent litigation along to consumers”).
167. See id. at 437–39 (discussing the questionable business practices of patent trolls).
168. See generally Mario Cervantes, Academic Patenting: How Universities and Public
Research Organizations Are Using Their Intellectual Property to Boost Research and Spur
Innovative Start-Ups, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/
academic_patenting.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2015) (discussing university gaps between
invention and commercialization).
169. Technically, patents are “assigned” to new owners, but to more easily distinguish
between transfers of ownership in a patent and licensing a patent, this Article refers to the “sale”
of patents where it makes sense to do so. See Philip Mendes, To License a Patent – or, to Assign
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accompanied by conditions granting the seller rights to future licensing
revenue from the patent.170 Alternatively, the patent owner may simply
sell the patent for more money if it knows that the buyer will likely
receive licensing money as well as value from using the patent.171
Others might complain that it can be difficult for a patent owner to
know the value of its patent until it is commercialized and in wide use, or
even to know if it will ever be widely used. This would seem to be a
reason not to sell a patent and instead to license it. This is a good point,
but this Article’s proposal, which would not begin charging enhanced
maintenance fees until the 7.5-year maintenance fee deadline, or about
ten years after filing, mitigates any problems related to valuing the patent
early in its life.172 By ten years on, the vast majority of patent owners
should be able to value their patents.
Another possible objection is that this proposal will have
anticompetitive effects. One could argue that a non-practicing patent
owner might prefer to license everyone on nondiscriminatory terms,
while a practicing patent owner may want to use the patent to exclude
competitors and thus drive up prices. While that may occur in some
instances, if a competitor can provide the patented goods or services more
cheaply or efficiently, then the value of the patent generally will be
greater to that competitor. It thus makes sense for even a competing
patent owner to license the competitor and make more money in
royalties.173 The one thing that a practicing patent owner will not do is
license the patent to itself and then sell the patent to a patent troll. It is
much more in the practicing patent owner’s interest to keep the patent,
precisely because there may be opportunities to license lower-cost
producers of the product down the road, which will be more valuable to
the practicing patent owner. Likewise, if a competitor comes up with an
improvement to the practicing patent owner’s patented product, such that
they each have blocking patents174 vis à vis the new and improved

It: Factors Influencing the Choice, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/
documents/pdf/license_assign_patent.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2015).
170. See generally Cervantes, supra note 168 (referencing exclusive and nonexclusive
licensing).
171. Mendez, supra note 169, at 3.
172. See supra notes 151–57 and accompanying text
173. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 471 (1966) (“No rational owner of a valuable patent would use
price control in its licenses to protect its own manufacturing operations since his net revenue
would decrease.”).
174. Blocking patents occur when an initial applicant obtains a patent, and a second applicant
obtains a patent that builds on the first patent. Together, the two patent owners are prevented, or
“blocked,” from fully exploiting the improved invention because of the overlapping exclusive
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product, then again it is in the practicing patent owner’s interest to own
the original patent. It can then engage in licensing to make the improved
product, or receive payment for allowing the improver to practice the
improved patent.
Thus, one sees that the advantages of having patent users be patent
owners far outweigh any disadvantages from encouraging non-practicing
patent owners to transfer their patents at the time of the 7.5-year
maintenance fee payment. And recall that even at 7.5 years after issuance,
so long as the non-practicing patent owner does not have more than 100
non-practiced patents, it will not owe any enhanced maintenance fees.175
The proposal also will encourage entities with more than 100 nonpracticed patents to transfer them to those who will use them by the 7.5year maintenance fee payment. If there is no other entity interested in
practicing the patents, then the non-practicing owner will be under
financial pressure to let the patent lapse because a large-entity owner will
face a fee of $7200 to $36,000 to maintain the patent,176 while a small
entity will face a fee of $3600 to $18,000,177 depending on how many
non-practiced patents it owns. The disincentive to renew non-practiced
patents is even stronger at the 11.5-year maintenance fee payment, when
large entities with more than 100 non-practiced patents will face
maintenance fees of $14,800 to $74,000 per patent,178 and small entities
with more than 100 patents will face maintenance fees of $7400 to
$37,000.179 This is all by design. Older, low-value patents are the very
patents that may be most susceptible to being used for trolling or
transferred to trolls.180 Especially by the point of the 11.5-year
maintenance fee payment, if there are no plans to practice the patent, it
seems unlikely that the patent owner will commercialize the patent.181 It
is at the point of this realization that a patent owner is most likely to seek
alternate ways of monetizing the patent, which will often result in
economically wasteful rent-seeking behavior in the form of trying to
rights. Each will be able to exclude the other from using the improved technology. John F. Duffy,
Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 442–43 (2004).
175. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
176. See supra Table 1.
177. See supra Table 2.
178. See supra Table 1.
179. See supra Table 2.
180. Davis, supra note 165, at 437–38 (using Acacia Research Corporation as an example of
an NPE that purchases patented technology as cheaply as possible from bankrupt companies and
then either leverages the patent into an expensive license or engages a competitor in litigation).
181. Drug companies can be an exception, as they may not bring product to market until late
in the patent life, depending on the clinical testing and regulatory approval process. But this
proposal will not affect pharmaceutical companies by this proposal because they do not have large
patent portfolios. See, e.g., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS pt.
B (2011) (showing Pfizer Inc. with forty-three active patents).
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extract money from either those who arguably practice the patent or those
who simply do not want to pay litigation costs. Increasing the costs of
maintaining the patents in force will make it more costly to hold unused
patents for rent-seeking behavior. The fact that the maintenance fee
enhancements are tiered adds extra incentive not to build up large
portfolios of non-practiced patents. At base, the goal of this proposal is
to make maintenance fees more effective at their basic purpose—culling
non-socially beneficial patents to reduce the number of patent thickets
and hold-ups.
C. Required Disclosures
The proposal’s workability turns on being able to gauge, accurately
and consistently, the number of patents under a company’s common
control. If patent owners can evade enhancement fees by transferring
patents to subsidiaries or branches, thereby breaking down large
portfolios, the incentive structure will fail. This proposal requires a patent
owner to disclose all parent entities and all entities subject to its common
control. Misrepresenting these facts would amount to fraud on the PTO,
just as misrepresenting small-entity status constitutes fraud on the
PTO.182 The PTO need not start from scratch in developing a definition
of common control; it can look to the tests used to evaluate affiliation
when determining small entity status,183 corporate law definitions of
ownership and control,184 and securities and tax law.185
Disclosure of related entities, portfolio size, and which patents are
practiced by which products will yield benefits apart from discouraging
the maintenance of older, low-value patents. As discussed above in Part
I, notice problems cause or exacerbate many of the current problems in
the patent system. Competitors cannot make informed decisions about
designing around their competitor’s products when it is not clear what
patents the competitor holds or what patents cover which products.186
Currently, no requirement exists for a patent holder to disclose what
patents it has acquired or which patents it believes cover which products.
The patent owner may mark certain products so as to give notice to others
that the product is patented,187 but it is not required to do so. Moreover,
182. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2015) (discussing the duty to disclose information material to
patentability).
183. 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012); 13 C.F.R. § 121.801–.805 (2015).
184. See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474–76 (2003).
185. See id.
186. See BESSEN & MUERER, supra note 14, at 47.
187. By marking the patent, the owner qualifies to receive extra damages from the start of
the infringing activity rather than limiting damages to infringement that occurs after another form
of notice, such as the filing of an action for infringement or an informative letter, is provided to
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without self-identification of ownership by patent holders, the public and
competitors have no reliable way to know who owns which patents.188
Forcing patent owners to declare which of their patents cover which
products and processes will significantly reduce uncertainty as to patent
boundaries and coverage. Once a patent owner has listed each patent that
reads on a particular product and each product upon which a particular
patent reads, it will be much easier for competitors to know which aspects
of the patent owner’s technology are claimed to be patented. This will
provide much greater certainty for competitors, who currently have to
guess what patents in a portfolio might be asserted against their attempts
to design around a patented invention.189
Professor Chien discusses the problems that arise from the inability to
know who owns what patents due to lax recordation of assignments.190
She describes how it is currently impossible to know who owns a
particular patent because there are no requirements that companies record
assignments of patents.191 Even companies that do record patent
assignments may refer to themselves inconsistently so that the PTO does
not attribute the patents to a single entity.192 In addition, patent owners
may assign patents to shell companies without disclosing their affiliation

the alleged infringer. See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (“In the event of failure so to mark, no damages shall
be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer was
notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may be
recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.”).
188. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 130 (2011) (“PTO records provide poor notice regarding current
ownership of patents.”).
189. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 54; Paul J. Heald, Optimal Remedies for
Patent Infringement: A Transactional Model, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1165, 1186 (2008) (“[T]he fuzzy
boundaries of some patents can make it difficult for firms acting in good faith to answer two
important questions: (1) Is the inventive firm’s patent valid? and (2) Is my choice of alternative
technology infringing?”); Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and
Disintegration of Intellectual Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1537
(2011) (“Furthermore, the boundaries of intellectual property rights can be difficult to ascertain.
The intangible nature of intellectual property means that boundaries are defined by words as
opposed to quantitative, geophysical measurements. The resulting disputes over claim
interpretation play a central role in most patent infringement lawsuits.”); Harry Surden, Efficient
Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737, 1752 (2011) (“When a patent
claim is uncertain because of a wide range of interpretive variability, a third party cannot easily
determine its boundaries. This increases the information transaction costs for a firm of estimating
and assessing infringement liability risk.” (footnote omitted)).
190. Colleen Chien, The Who Owns What Problem in Patent Law 5 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch.
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-12, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995664.
191. Id. at 2–3.
192. Id. at 3 & n.9 (“One commercial service . . . has assembled a database that includes
2,317 different spellings of IBM.”).
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with the parent companies.193 Some companies do this deliberately to
disguise the ownership of the patents they intend to assert until the time
of assertion.194 The largest patent assertion firms, such as Intellectual
Ventures and Acacia, are well known to have assigned their patents to
numerous shell companies so as to disguise the ownership of the
patents.195
Chien describes the problems that this lack of ownership information
creates in the market for buying and selling patents as well as for
competitors who might compete in fields arguably covered by the
patents.196 Patent assertion firms that purposely disguise ownership of
patents may do so to maintain the element of surprise in asserting patents
or to make it difficult for others to target their patent portfolios for
reexamination or other validity challenges.197
Uncertainty and lack of transparency as to patent ownership do not
serve public policy. While it may be advantageous to certain patent
assertion firms, uncertainty as to patent ownership is contrary to the goals
and purposes of patent law. As discussed in the beginning of this
Article,198 patents are issued to create incentives for invention and
dissemination of innovation by allowing inventors to have exclusive
rights over their inventions for twenty years.199 As many scholars have
pointed out, for patents to function efficiently in the market, the
boundaries, status, and ownership of patents should be clear and
transparent.200 The boundaries of the patent must be known to avoid
infringement, but the boundaries are often unclear. This creates
uncertainty as to which patents need to be licensed (if they are available
for licensing) and how an innovator can design its patent so as not to
overlap with existing ones.201 Patent ownership must be clear if the patent
marketplace is to function efficiently. Participants in an industry need to
know whom to contact to negotiate licenses.

193. Id. at 1.
194. Id. at 3–4 (noting that a preliminary analysis of patent litigation filings by “trolls” or
“patent assertion entities” revealed that “in about a third of the cases, the plaintiff was not the
patent owner of record as of the day the litigation was initiated”).
195. Id. at 4.
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id.
198. See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text.
199. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (“[T]he
ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure.”).
200. See supra note 14.
201. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 14, at 54–56.
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Furthermore, because approximately 2.1 million patents are in
force,202 in some industries it is very difficult, if not impossible, for a
participant to know of every patent that might be asserted against it.203
Notwithstanding that some industries include many tens of thousands of
patents,204 sophisticated participants in industries and sophisticated
patent search firms are adept at finding patents in force that are directly
on point.205 The problem arises from the difficulty in finding and
predicting which patents directed primarily to other products, processes,
or industries could have claims that arguably read on the products or
processes of an industry participant.206 Given that fact, industry
participants would like to know which patents well-known patent
assertion firms own as well as which new patents these firms acquire.
Patent assertion firms may prefer to keep this information secret in hopes
that industry participants will successfully commercialize products and
processes that the firm can then claim infringe its patents, requiring
payment. This opportunistic assertion behavior does not serve any
socially beneficial purpose. Rather, it is this sort of behavior that leads
some to call such patent assertion firms “trolls,” after the storybook
creature that waits for unsuspecting people to pass over its bridge and
then jumps up and makes demands in exchange for letting people cross
the bridge.207
It makes sense to minimize the ability of assertion firms to take others
by surprise. Forcing patent assertion firms to disclose all of the patents
202. See Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents Are In-Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05/how-many-us-patents-are-in-force.html.
203. See Albert P. Halluin, Incorporation of Parts into the Whole: Avoiding Liability When
Incorporating Nanotechnology Improvements, 3 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 25, 29 (2006)
(“This large number of patents and patent applications exemplifies the minefield that
nanotechnology patents represent, making it difficult for practitioners to know if and which patent
or multiple patents they may infringe.”).
204. See infra Appendix.
205. See Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187,
204 (2011) (“In light of these increased incentives for suppliers to engage in search, patent holders
would be able to reduce their own expenditures on search accordingly. Because search by patent
holders is likely less efficient than search by commercial firms, this would likely reduce the
amount of social waste generated as producers and consumers of intellectual property attempt to
locate one another.”).
206. See id. at 194 (“A patent may not contain the key words that a potential infringer would
expect to find in a search, or it may concern an invention that appears largely unrelated to the
technology at issue.”).
207. See Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder,
25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 690 (2012) (“In invoking an image of a mythological creature that
lies under a bridge and waits to impose a toll on unsuspecting travelers, the term ‘patent troll’ was
popularized in 2001 by Peter Detkin, then Intel’s general counsel.”); see also PAUL GALDONE,
THE THREE BILLY GOATS GRUFF (1973) (telling the story of a troll who lives under a bridge
threatening to eat the goats that pass overhead).
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they own across shell companies, subsidiaries, and other companies they
control would help reduce the trolling problem. If industry participants
know which patents belong to which patent assertion firms, then the
participants can take extra care in searching these portfolios and can give
such patents a wider berth, or they can simply attempt to instigate
licensing negotiations before commercializing a product rather than
afterward.
Requiring prompt registration and disclosure of patent ownership and
transfer is beneficial in its own right, and the PTO could implement this
separately from any maintenance fee enhancements. The difficulty is
determining what penalties to impose for failure to disclose. Should a
company be fined for failure to disclose properly? Should some of its
patents be deemed unenforceable? Which ones? The problem with a
harsh remedy such as unenforceability is that it will create large selfpolicing and transaction costs for patent owners, who will worry that a
minor mistake could forfeit the patent. Adding another ground for patent
unenforceability would also likely result in patent defendants spending
inordinate time, money, and court resources making assertions of
improper disclosure in attempts to make patents unenforceable. It was
precisely this kind of litigation tactic that encouraged Congress to
liberalize the law as to disclosures of prior art in patent applications.208
Broadly imposing unenforceability for failing to properly disclose
ownership would be contrary to Congress’s policy of reducing litigation
expenses surrounding technical missteps.
Tying the requirement to disclose this information about patent
portfolios to the maintenance fee enhancements proposed in this Article
has specific advantages over simply requiring such disclosure. Because
each maintenance fee payment is tied to a specific patent, any penalties
for nondisclosure that exceed fines can be tied to that specific patent.
Thus, for the most egregious nondisclosures, the PTO could treat the
patent as not having been maintained.
It is vital, however, not to make the patent-disclosure requirement so
burdensome that it paralyzes the system or causes patent owners great
costs. This is why it is probably best to require a patent owner to disclose
only one product or process practiced by each of its patents rather than
requiring disclosure of every version of each covered product. The
disclosure system must be designed so that it is not too taxing for owners
to disclose which patents they own and at least one product or process per
patent that is covered, if any are. A patent owner’s worry that it may
inadvertently fail to include an affiliate when disclosing can be
ameliorated by providing clear rules as to which entities are deemed
208. Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act and Its Implications for
Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 110–14 (2012) (describing how the America Invents Act changed
patent law relating to prior art disclosures).
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under common control and by providing a no-fault opportunity for an
owner to correct good-faith errors. Finally, by providing that the owner
need only identify one current use per patent, the system can ensure that
labeling practiced patents is not too burdensome.
A number of other penalties short of making a patent unenforceable
are possible as well. Instead of invalidating patents, the PTO could
enhance maintenance fees related to nondisclosures. For example, for any
maintenance filings that contain bad disclosures, the PTO could double
or triple the already-enhanced maintenance fees as penalty for the lack of
disclosure or inaccurate disclosure.
Aggregating patent ownership across related entities presents various
challenges. First, there is the question of whether the PTO should require
disclosure of all ownership interests. Should patent owners have to
aggregate only patents owned by companies in which they have a
majority ownership interest? Or should the standard instead be
controlling interest? If so, should there be bright-line rules defining what
a controlling interest is, or should there be a functional test? Certainly all
patents owned directly by a firm and by all parents, subsidiaries, and
sibling companies should be included.
But how should the PTO treat patent licenses when aggregating
patents across companies to determine patent portfolio size? Should it
attribute exclusive licenses to the licensor, the licensee, or both? Legal
ownership of the patent plainly resides with the licensor. Licensees that
receive nonexclusive licenses should not have the nonexclusively
licensed patents considered part of their patent portfolios because a
nonexclusive license is basically protection against being sued for using
the patent; it gives no right to enforce the patent.209
What about exclusive licenses to a patent? The Federal Circuit has
distinguished between two types of exclusive patent licenses. For patent
licenses that convey “all substantial rights” in a patent, the licensee is, for
most purposes, treated as if it owns the patent.210 For instance, the
licensee need not join the patent owner as a plaintiff in a patent suit.211
For “exclusive” licenses that convey fewer than all substantial patent
rights, however, the licensee must join the patent owner to the suit to

209. See Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1131 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that
a licensee with fewer than all substantial rights “may obtain sufficient rights in the patent to be
entitled to seek relief from infringement, but to do so, it ordinarily must join the patent owner”);
see also Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (“However, this court has recognized the principle that a patent owner may be joined
by an exclusive licensee.”).
210. See Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1131.
211. See id.
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enforce the patent.212
It makes sense to treat all licensed patents with all substantial patent
rights as part of the licensee’s patent portfolio. After all, the licensee is
acting in the place of the patent owner for all purposes relevant to
determining disclosure and enhanced maintenance fees. Thus, if a firm
owns 600 non-practiced patents outright and has exclusive licenses that
grant it all substantial patent rights in another 500 non-practiced patents,
the firm would qualify for a maintenance fee enhancement of three times
base at the 7.5 and 11.5-year maintenance fee payment periods.213 For a
small entity this would amount to $5400, and for a large entity the fee
would be $10,800.214
Should a patent owner that has granted an exclusive license giving all
substantial patent rights to the licensee have that patent counted in its
patent portfolio for purposes of calculating maintenance fee
enhancements? It would seem that if the patent owner does not have the
right to enforce the patent, then it should not have that patent counted as
part of its portfolio. But what if patent owners tried to game the system
by granting licensees all substantial patent rights in their non-practiced
patents while making the license revocable upon demand by the licensor?
This would allow a licensor to license its patents to numerous other
parties that will fall below the 100 non-practiced patents threshold. If the
owner of the patent can revoke the license at any time, then companies
could escape paying enhanced maintenance fees by licensing their patents
in this way and only revoking the licenses of the patents that they want to
enforce at the time of enforcement. For this reason, all patents that a firm
owns across its affiliated entities must be counted toward its own patent
portfolio. This will prevent gaming the system, and there is no obvious
downside to it. If a patent owner is willing to transfer all substantial rights
in a patent, then—if it is worried about having too many non-practiced
patents in its portfolio—it can simply assign the patent instead, and the
patent will no longer be counted as one of the firm’s patents.
What if a firm grants an exclusive license that gives all substantial
patent rights for a period of time, say five years, and does so irrevocably?
In that case, it might seem reasonable not to attribute the patent to the
patent owner during the time of the exclusive license. But it is probably
unnecessarily complicated to not count such transactions, and so it would
be better to simply attribute all owned patents to their owner.
What about the licensees of exclusive licenses? It makes sense to
count all patents for which they have exclusive licenses, and which they
can therefore enforce, as part of their portfolios—whether or not they
have the form of exclusive license that requires them to join the patent
212. Id.
213. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
214. See supra Tables 1 and 2.
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owners to any enforcement suits. Obviously, licensed patents that
licensees can enforce without naming the owner to the lawsuit are patents
the licensee controls for all purposes related to the maintenance fee
enhancements proposed in this Article. As for licensees holding
“exclusive” licenses that fail to give all substantial patent rights, and that
therefore can only be enforced if the owner joins the suit, it still makes
sense to count these patents as part of these licensees’ portfolios. To do
otherwise would again tempt assertion entities to game the system and
hold exclusive licenses that fail to give all substantial rights but then to
have separate contractual relationships with the patent owners requiring
them to join any lawsuits. To prevent this gaming, it makes sense to
attribute all patents subject to such licenses to the portfolios of both the
owners and the licensees. This will not negatively affect firms that
purchase exclusive licenses to patents that they need for their business.
The enhanced maintenance fees will penalize only firms that own or
license more than 100 non-practiced patents. There are few legitimate
reasons to exclusively license patents that one never intends to use.
What about patent pools? Should patents held in a pool be attributed
to the portfolios of each member of the pool? In almost any case the
answer should be no. The typical patent pool operates as a means for two
or more firms to cross-license any patents needed to make products or
processes in a particular space. Typically, these licenses are
nonexclusive, and therefore only the owners can enforce them. If a case
arose in which two parties cross-licensed patents exclusively such that
either could actually enforce them, then treating this as an exclusive
license and attributing the patents to each entity would make sense, as
explained above in discussing dual attribution of exclusively licensed
patents.
III. BENEFITS
This Part explains the benefits of the proposed maintenance fee
enhancement. This Article’s proposal decreases the size of patent
portfolios, avoids the standard inter-industry loggerheads, and increases
disclosure as to patent boundaries and ownership. Further, the proposal
provides more funds for the PTO.
A. Decrease the Size of Patent Portfolios
First, increasing the cost of maintaining non-practiced patents at the
7.5 and 11.5-year renewals should decrease the number of non-practiced
patents in patent owners’ portfolios. Whenever the expected net present
benefit of the non-practiced patent is less than the enhanced maintenance
fee, it will not make sense to maintain the patent. While the doubling of
the fee on a few patents is not a major disincentive, for large entities that
hold thousands of non-practiced patents, the enhancements can ramp up
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into the high five figures per patent, which should provide real deterrence
against maintaining patents held speculatively against future
monetization opportunities.
B. Avoid the Standard Inter-industry Loggerheads
Another benefit of this Article’s proposal is that it overcomes one of
the major roadblocks to patent reform: too many proposed reforms have
pitted one industry against another.215 Some industries have favored
previously suggested reforms to deal with assertion entities or patent
thickets, while others have opposed them.216 These proposals have
included weakening the availability of injunctions, allowing compulsory
licenses, raising the standards for patentability, making reexamination
and invalidation of patents easier, and changing the presumption of
validity.217 While many have proposed and lobbied these and other
suggested reforms over the years, and a number of reform proposals have
made it into failed patent reform bills in Congress, 218 the powerful
opposition of different industry groups prevented any of these reforms
from going into effect.219 Instead, the AIA took a few modest steps
215. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 972 (2007) (“It is clearer and clearer that different industries
experience the patent system in very different terms. They innovate differently, they get patents
differently, and they use those patents differently. These differences have manifested themselves
most recently in debates over legislative patent reform, which have pitted the biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industries against the information technology industries on virtually every issue.”
(footnote omitted)).
216. Sarah A. Geers, Comment, Common Sense and the Fact Finder Without Skill in the Art:
The Role of Objective Evidence in Achieving Proper Technology Specificity, 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 225, 259 (2010) (“For these reasons, the computer industry is particularly vulnerable to
patent thickets, innocent infringement, and patent trolling, and the computer industry has thus led
the call for patent reform.” (footnote omitted)).
217. See Lemley, supra note 85, at 1529 (recommending a lower evidentiary standard for
initially granted patents); Raymond A. Mercado, The Use and Abuse of Patent Reexamination:
Sham Petitioning Before the USPTO, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 92, 98, 155 (2011)
(proposing the creation of a cause of action for patent holders “subject to unwarranted
reexamination proceedings”); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential
Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 73 (2007) (proposing a variable standard of patent validity
such that unchallenged patents “receive a weak presumption of validity” and patents that pass
post-grant review receive “a strong presumption of validity”).
218. See Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures:
Recent Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L.
381, 408 n.223 (2009) (citing Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 6(a) (as
referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009)) (noting that the Patent Reform Act of
2009 proposed new procedures for reexamination to improve patent quality).
219. See John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 505 (2010)
(“On Capitol Hill, Orwellian-named entities representing a variety of industry heavy-weights have
poured millions into lobbying for or against patent reform bills, with a major focus of dispute
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toward reform because those were the only reforms that could attract
enough support.220 Thus, while the AIA has somewhat revamped postgrant review and reexamination processes,221 and added some prior user
rights,222 it passed no major reforms addressing issues of patent thickets,
trolling, or the aggressive and chilling use of large patent portfolios.223
Typically, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries opposed the
kinds of reforms that interested the high-technology and software
industries.224 The benefit of the solution this Article proposes is that it
affects only those with large portfolios of non-practiced patents. The
industries with the largest patent portfolios are high technology and
software.225 These are also the industries most desperate for reform,226 so
they should not oppose this proposal. In the meantime, pharmaceutical,
biology, and life-sciences firms typically have smaller patent

being legislative language regarding damage awards.”); David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages
Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 136 (2009) (“Opposition to the
damages reform proposals comes from many small and mid-size technology companies,
particularly those that manufacture and sell components that are incorporated into end-user
products by other manufacturers, and from academic research institutions, labor unions, the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, and the American Bar Association’s Section on
Intellectual Property Law.”).
220. See Gregory N. Mandel, Patents: Will America Reinvent Itself? Patent Reform in 2011,
A.B.A: BUS. L. TODAY (Aug. 18, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/content/
2011/08/keepingcurrent-patents.shtml (“To date, none of the patent reform bills have passed.
Patent legislation introduced this year, the ‘America Invents Act’, incorporates a more modest set
of reforms and has been met with broader backing.” (citations omitted)).
221. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–300
(2011).
222. See id. at § 5, 125 Stat. at 297.
223. Mike Masnick, Patent Office Seeking Comments on How to Implement a ‘First to File’
Regime Instead of ‘First to Invent,’ TECHDIRT (July 31, 2012, 10:58 PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120731/01341819888/patent-office-seeking-comments-howto-implement-first-to-file-regime-instead-first-to-invent.shtml (“Nothing in the AIA actually
dealt with the problems of patent trolls or patent thickets.”).
224. See Opderbeck, supra note 219, at 187 (“The principal architects of reform are
established computer technology companies for which patents are not a significant form of
protection. They wish to squeeze patents further into the shape of a narrow contract-like right
subject to a liability rule. The principal opponents of reform are patent-rich industries, such as
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, which wish to retain a broad patent franchise subject to a
property rule.”).
225. See infra Appendix.
226. See Opderbeck, supra note 219, at 187; see also Carl E. Gulbrandsen et al., Patent
Reform Should Not Leave Innovation Behind, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 328, 329
(2009) (“More recently, the major driver for reform has been a coalition of large information
technology and financial service companies . . . .”).
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portfolios;227 thus, this proposal is less likely to affect them, and they
should not find it terribly objectionable. In addition, an advantage of the
PTO using its fee-setting authority to adopt this Article’s proposed
enhanced maintenance fee system is that neither legislation nor industry
approval is needed.228
C. Increase Disclosure as to Patent Boundaries and Ownership
The effect that this proposal will have on patent disclosures may be
just as beneficial as the effect it will have on decreasing the number of
non-practiced older patents. Part II, above, discusses the numerous
problems that exist with inadequate patent disclosure. This Article’s
proposal will alleviate many of the problems associated with this lack of
clarity by requiring disclosure of patent ownership and practice as well
as by making available the determination of patent boundaries without
resorting to litigation.
Under the terms of this Article’s proposal, patent owners will have to
identify the patents in their portfolios when they pay maintenance fees.
As explained above, patent owners will have to submit a list of all patents
they own and that any entity they control owns when they make
maintenance fee payments. In that submission, patent owners will have
to identify which patents they are practicing and which they are not. The
fact that some patent assertion firms purposely create numerous shell
companies to hide the true ownership of the patents they control provides
the best evidence that patent ownership information is important to
potential defendants.229 If a potential defendant knows which patents a
patent assertion firm holds, the defendant can take steps to better protect
itself from rent-seeking patent assertion behavior. First of all, potential
defendants can try to give a wider berth to patents held by assertion firms.
Being more careful about designing around the patents held by assertion
firms is one strategy; simply avoiding certain areas in which assertion
firms have patents is another. Many potential defendants, however, will
not want to change their business strategies simply to avoid potential
lawsuits over patents that may be infringed, especially given the number
of patents out there and the uncertainty of patent boundaries.
Perhaps more importantly, companies can search the portfolios of
patent assertion firms to determine whether they should initiate licensing
discussions ahead of time, before they make major investments in a
potentially infringing product. This would help mitigate the hold-up
problem that can occur when assertion firms wait to assert their patents
227. See Adelman & DeAngelis, supra note 17, at 1697 (“The small patent portfolio sizes
also provide indirect evidence that patent anticommons are uncommon in the biotechnology
sector.”).
228. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
229. Chien, supra note 190, at 6.
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until a company has made substantial investments in developing,
manufacturing, and marketing a product. Currently, even if a company
conducts a prior art search, it can be time consuming and difficult to find
the current owner of any potentially problematic patents, sometimes
because the owners do not want to be found prior to infringement.
Allowing companies to monitor the portfolios of assertion entities will
help decrease an information asymmetry that is costly to active industry
participants and is only beneficial to patent owners in ways that are
socially detrimental.230
D. More Funding for the PTO
Another advantage of the proposal is that it better funds the PTO. By
charging high maintenance fees to those with large portfolios of nonpracticed patents, the PTO will also be providing itself with enough
income to meet its goals of increasing hiring and decreasing the patent
application backlog.
IV. COSTS, DISADVANTAGES, OBJECTIONS
This Part addresses some potential objections to the maintenance fee
solution that this Article proposes. Some may think this proposal will
make the patent system more expensive, while others might worry that it
will increase the burden on patent holders. Possible gaming concerns also
exist as well as concerns that patent assertion entities will move toward
portfolios of young patents. This Part attempts to ameliorate these
concerns.
A. Objection: Just Increase Maintenance Fees Across the Board
Some might argue that all of the disclosure and non-practiced patent
portfolio size calculations called for in this Article are a waste of time and
that if decreasing the size of patent portfolios is desired, then it would be
better just to increase patent fees across the board. But sizeable acrossthe-board increases would decrease patenting. It is better to let patents
bloom young and then weed out the non-practiced patents later. This is
also in keeping with the PTO’s proposed approach of increasing
maintenance fees but decreasing the initial costs of getting patents.231 A
focus on making patent filing and prosecution less expensive, and only
increasing the costs significantly about halfway through the life of a
patent, is an approach that encourages innovation and dissemination
while also weeding out low-value patents that may be used in ways that
230. Patent assertion firms can acquire more patents at any time and any patent owner may
choose to assert its patents if it thinks they are being infringed. But the greatly increased
transparency created by this proposal will make such strategic behavior a much smaller problem.
231. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
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are not beneficial to society.
B. The Proposal Makes the Patent System More Expensive, Which
Decreases Incentives to Innovate
Another possible objection is that this Article’s proposal makes the
patent system more expensive, which will decrease the incentive to
innovate. This objection need not occupy anyone long, however, because
as explained above, the costs of patenting will not increase for the first
half of the patent’s life. Thereafter, patentees will be encouraged to get
rid of low-value patents. A firm can maintain any non-practiced patent
that it plans to practice in the future, or which the firm otherwise knows
is valuable, if its net present value is greater than the enhanced
maintenance fee. Moreover, any practiced patent will not be subject to
enhanced maintenance fee payments.
C. The Proposal Burdens Patent Holders
Another possible objection is that this Article’s proposal will be
expensive and burdensome for patent holders. It is true that there will be
some significant expenses for firms with large portfolios, especially at
first, as firms spend time analyzing which of their patents they practice
and which products or processes the patents cover. This burden should
not be understated. Accordingly, it may make sense to give a fairly long
lead-in time to allow firms to comply. But it should also be noted that
while this will be burdensome to patent owners, the current system with
all of its uncertainty as to patent ownership and coverage is already
burdensome and costly to others. Thus, because the burden of
determining patent ownership and coverage cannot be eliminated, it
makes sense to assign that determination to the party that can calculate it
at the lowest cost—the patent owners. In the aggregate, shifting these
burdens to the patent owners should increase social welfare.
D. Participants Will Game the System
Another possible objection is that the proposal is susceptible to
gaming. For instance, patent owners may assign their patents to unrelated
entities with a right to a portion of any profits that are gained from
enforcing the patent. This should not be worrisome, however, because if
the owner assigns the patents to patent assertion entities, then they will
be subject to the increased maintenance fees as their portfolios of nonpracticed patents grow. A contractual obligation to share profits does not
change the incentive structure set out by the maintenance fee
enhancements proposed in this Article.
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E. NPEs Will Collect Portfolios of Young Patents
Another effect of this Article’s proposal may be to encourage patent
assertion entities to move toward portfolios of young patents. An
assertion firm with young patents will not incur the enhanced
maintenance fees that only begin 7.5 years after the PTO issues the patent.
It is true that assertion firms may try to avoid older patents, but this is not
a problem. If assertion firms are not buying older patents, and it becomes
more expensive to maintain them if a firm has more than 100 nonpracticed patents, then the decreased market for these older patents will
mean that fewer of them will be maintained. This will be true even if the
patent owners do not qualify for enhanced maintenance fees because just
paying the unenhanced fees will not be worthwhile if the patent is nearly
worthless. And even if older patents are maintained, as a practical matter,
if assertion firms are not holding them, then the chances of socially
harmful enforcement are greatly decreased. Thus, industry participants
will be able to breathe easier despite potentially being covered by old,
non-practiced patents. Finally, owners of young patents, much like
parents of young children, tend to be very hopeful for the future of their
babies. They are unlikely to part with these young patents as cheaply as
they will if they are unsuccessful at commercializing them for ten years.
Thus, while assertion entities may want larger portfolios of young
patents, the costs of these patents should drive the assertion entities
toward smaller portfolios than would be required for efficient operation
under the status quo. Finally, to the extent that patent assertion entities
increase their demand for young patents, this increases the incentive to
invent and patent new technology, rather than to focus on extracting rent
from old patents. This should be a socially beneficial shift.
CONCLUSION
This Article recommends that the PTO take full advantage of its feesetting authority by enhancing patent maintenance fees as a way to
discourage patent owners from keeping large portfolios of non-practiced
patents. The Article explains that it is beneficial to discourage large
portfolios of non-practiced patents regardless of whether the patent owner
is an NPE or an industry participant that practices many of its own
patents. In the current environment, NPEs may buy a number of older,
non-practiced patents cheaply and then try to monetize the patents
through rent-seeking behavior. The current environment also allows
industry participants to use their large patent portfolios, including their
non-practiced patents, in ways that are socially detrimental if not
anticompetitive. This Article’s proposal would decrease the number of
older, non-practiced patents and thus would help alleviate both of these
harms. This Article’s proposal has another major benefit. In the course of
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certifying their practiced and non-practiced patents for purposes of
determining maintenance fee enhancements, patent owners will provide
the PTO and the public with very valuable information as to patent
ownership and patent coverage of existing products and processes. This
Article also considers objections to the proposal and rejects them as either
not significant or vastly outweighed by the benefits of this proposal.
Accordingly, this Article maintains its position that the proposal made
herein could provide major benefits to participants in the patent system.
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APPENDIX
Patent Issuances
1994–2011
Firm
IBM
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd
Canon K. K.
Sony Corp.
Toshiba Corp.
Hitachi Ltd.
Fujitsu Limited
Intel Corp.
NEC Corp.
Micron Technology, Inc.
Microsoft Corp.
General Electric Co.
Mitsubishi Denki K.K.
Hewlett–Packard Co.
Seiko Epson Corp.
Texas Instruments, Incorp.
Seimens Aktiengsesellschaft
Xerox Corp.
Honda Motor Co., Ltd.
Ricoh Co.
Sharp Corp.
Robert Bosch GmbH
LG Electronics Inc.
Philips
Infineon Technologies AG
Panasonic Corp.
Cisco Technology, Inc.
Du Pont
Toyota Jidosha K. K.
Hon Hai Precision Ind. Co., Ltd.
Honeywell International Inc.
Sanyo Electronic Co., Ltd.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
Broadcom Corp.
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Issued U.S. Patents
1994–2011
58,692
40,548
34,132
24,538
24,445
22,805
20,845
20,184
19,569
19,101
17,587
17,483
15,499
13,900
13,226
12,668
12,162
11,331
10,547
10,211
9998
9599
8879
7968
7435
6990
6703
6663
6420
6252
5951
5837
5696
5678
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Firm
Boeing Co.
Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co., Ltd.
Brother Kogyo K. K.
Nokia Corp.
Hynix Semiconductor Co.
Qualcomm, Inc.
Apple
Medtronic Inc.
AT&T Intellectual Property I, L.P.
Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc.
GM Global Technology Operations, Inc.
Renesas Electronics Corp.
Fujifilm
Google, Inc.
Silverbrook Research Pty. Ltd.
Research In Motion
LG Display Co., Ltd.
Denso Corp.
Fuji Xerox Co. Ltd.
Marvell International Ltd.
Electronics and Telecommunications Research
Inst.
Hong Fu Jin Precision Industry (Shenzhen) Co.
Ltd
Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.
SAP Aktiengesellschaft
Oracle America, Inc.
Industrial Technology Research Inst., Taiwan
3M Innovative Properties Company
Tokyo Electron Limited
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Issued U.S. Patents
1994–2011
5487
5439
5188
4837
4813
4344
3416
3179
1752
1,658
1,092
984
963
900
812
663
643
631
582
517
505
495
483
477
475
462
457
456
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